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VILLAGE BANKS,CAISSES VILLAGEOISES, AND CREDIT UNIONS: 
LESSONS FROM CLIENT-OWNED MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
IN WEST AFRICA1 
Korotoumou Ouattara, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and Douglas H. Graham2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Rationale and Objectives 
This case study is a component of the research project on Client-Owned Microfinance 
Organizations: Lessons from West Africa, conducted by the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio 
State Univetsity (OSU) under the Microfinance Best Practices (MBP) Program. The main objective 
of the study i has been to assess the strengths and weaknesses of mutualist financial organizations in 
the delivery of microfinance services, both loans and deposit facilities, in comparatively poor 
countries. ' 
The' common thread that binds several types of mutualist financial organizations is that they 
are client-o~ed institutions. Some of them are financial cooperatives developed along traditional 
credit unio11i designs, others are village banking systems sponsored by international non-governmental 
2 
Case study prepared for the Microenterprise Best Practices (MBP) Program, funded by the 
I 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Additional funding was 
rec~ived from the OARDC at The Ohio State University. The interpretations and opinions 
are ,those of the authors and not necessarily those of the sponsoring organizations. 
Otq1.ttara, now at The World Bank, was a Research Specialist until April 1998 and Gonzalez-
V ega and Graham are Professors in the Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and 
De;velopment Economics at The Ohio State University (OSU). Gonzalez-Vega is also 
Di11'ector of the Rural Finance Program at OSU. The authors are particularly grateful with 
Barbara MkNelly, Peggy Roark, and her colleagues at Freedom from Hunger, for their 
extensive comments on earlier drafts, with Renee Chao-Beroff at the Centre International de 
Developpement et de Recherche (CIDR), for her support of their earlier research in West 
Africa, and with Thomas Shaw (PIEC Savings and Credit Program), for his guidance in Mali. 
Genevieve Nguyen and Mayada Baydas were contributors to the earlier OSU research in the 
region. Robin Young (DAI) and Annica Jensen (USAID) have been patient managers of the 
project. This exercise would not have been possible without the assistance and warm 
ho~pitality of officers and clients of the programs visited, as listed in Annex A. Lori Kam 
I 
was, as always, helpful with the word processing. 
1 
organizations (NGOs), and still others are village-owned savings and credit associations, including 
the caisses villageoises that operate in several African countries. 
The caisses villageoises model discussed here was designed by a French NGO, the Centre 
International de Developpement et de Recherche (CIDR), and key elements observed in informal 
village organizations were adopted in the design.3 This model was first implemented in the mid-1980s 
in Burkina Faso, and it is now found in Mali, The Gambia, Niger, Madagascar, Ethiopia, and Sao 
Tome et Prinbipe.4 This MBP case study compares these caisses villageoises with two other distinct 
types of client-owned organizations, which have been providing microfinance services to poor clients 
in West Afriba. 
One pf these alternative organizational designs are the financial cooperatives or credit unions, 
which have qeen developed in West Africa primarily through the auspices of The World Council of 
Credit Unioqs (WOCCU) and the Canadian organization Developpement International Desjardins 
(DID). The pther type of organizational design are the village banking systems developed from the 
original mod~l ofFINCA International and sponsored in West Africa, with important adaptations, by 
US-based NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Freedom from Hunger, and Save the 
Children. 
I 
The present case study conducts a preliminary comparative analysis of these three institutional 
forms. The~ are several advantages of undertaking a comparative analysis. The comparison makes 
it possible to identify some common threads that may explain the success or failure of this type of 
organization$ as well as common factors that may generally facilitate or limit their future expansion. 
I 
The identification of common features shared by all types of client-owned organizations can 
enrich a diseussion about the challenges faced by organizations with similar structures of property 
rights and With the resulting governance mechanisms. The effort to derive some stylized facts 
common to 1 all of these types of organizations has carried the danger, however, that some of the 
differentiatif g features may have been missed by the researchers.5 
The bbservation of differences in the performance of alternative varieties of the client-owned 
institutional' model makes it possible, nevertheless, to rank these diverse attempts to address the 
I 
3 
4 
s 
The 1term caisses villageoises is used extensively in West Africa to designate various types 
of ~utualist organizations. The terms caisse populaire and caisse locale are also common. 
The 1 term caisses villageoises is used here in the narrow sense of the model developed by 
I c1qR. 
For~ in-depth analysis of the caisses villageoises in Mali, see Ouattara, Nguyen, Gonzalez-
Ve~a and Graham (1997) and Gonzalez-Vega, Nguyen, and Outtara (1998). 
Thelresearchers are aware that, in their attempt to build a stylized model of these institutio.ns, 
they may not always do full justice to particular organizations and to the adjustments that they 
havr adopted. The purpose of the case study, however, was not to evaluate specific 
org~izations but to derive lessons of general interest. 
2 
challenges posed by mutualist institutions according to their apparent effectiveness. The final 
objective of the research project is to derive lessons to be used by village banking organizations in 
their efforts to evolve into large-scale, fully sustainable financial intermediaries. 
The analysis of this case study is a first attempt to look at the comparative performance of 
mutualist organizations in low income countries and, by necessity, it focuses on broad features of 
these organizations. A more detailed analysis would be needed to evaluate the performance of the 
individual organizations observed here to illustrate the questions addressed by the study. Such an 
evaluation of individual performance was not the purpose of the case study and it is not accomplished 
here, in part due to the limitation of the resources available and in part due to the short visits to the 
organizations. The objective, instead, has been to derive some specific lessons of general interest 
from a brie£ observation of these experiences. 
Moreover, this case study does not rank mutualist versus non-mutualist organizations and 
does not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative structures of property rights. This 
is an important question, however, because an organization's performance is the result of decisions 
influenced by incentives that emerge, in turn, from the structure of property rights of the organization. 
Many micro~ance organizations suffer from structures of attenuated property rights (lack ofwell-
defined owi;iers ), which threaten their sustainability. 
I 
B. Co1'ceptual Issues 
The theoretical literature has amply discussed advantages and disadvantages of mutualist 
financial organizations, and empirical evidence on their costs and benefits has been collected on 
financial cooperatives (Flannery, 1974; Smith et al., 1981; Poyo, 1986). 
The benefits of mutualist organizations emerge from their information and contract 
enforcemen't advantages (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega, and Aguilera-Alfred, 1992; Shaw, 1995). Members 
of a small credit union, for example, can use their stock of knowledge about other individual members 
in screening and monitoring borrowers and can mobilize peer pressure for the enforcement of 
contracts. Voluntary work can be used to run the organization and to monitor its performance. 
' 
I 
Th~ disadvantages of these organizations emerge from their ownership and governance 
structures. ,In particular, the voting rule of one person, one vote may constrain the expansion of the 
financial ffows of the cooperative, because it promotes free riding by members and causes difficulties 
in exercising adequate internal control, particularly as the organization gets larger (Chaves, 1994). 
That is, members are discouraged from keeping a large sum of money deposited with the cooperative, 
because they cannot exercise a degree of control commensurate with the size of their investment and 
their stake1 at risk. 
Moreover, when external funds are mobilized, there are strong incentives for the credit union 
to become 'borrower-dominated, and the conflicts of interests resulting from the dual role of owners 
and clients' may lead to distorted pricing (interest-rate) policies and to insufficient vigor in collecting 
loans. It hPs been argued, therefore, that efforts to increase the role of net depositors, coupled with 
3 
independent prudential supervision, may help address some of these shortcomings of organizational 
design (Poyo, 1989; Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega and Aguilera-Alfred, 1993). 
Mobilizing deposits, however, is not an easy task (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1998). There is 
debate about the costs of this task of financial intermediation and about the appropriate regulatory 
framework required (GTZ, 1997). These challenges are further complicated by the volatility of 
financial flo1Vs in poor, risky environments such as those in West Africa. The purpose of this case 
study is to explore these issues for the three types of mutualist organizations analyzed. 
i 
C. Main Empirical Questions 
Sevt"lral potential lessons for institutional design and paths to sustainability can be learned from 
the analysis of these three types of mutualist organizations in West Africa. The main questions 
addressed irl deriving these lessons are: 
(a) How have the savings-deposit and credit instruments of these organizations achieved 
significant outreach? How does the breadth and depth of outreach (numbers and levels of 
I 
poverty of the clientele) compare across these organizational types and how can one describe 
the market niches where they operate? What explains the degree of outreach achieved? 
(b) How have the loan and deposit instruments of these organizations been adapted to meet the 
demand for financial services of low-income rural people, especially women, to engage in 
conimmption-smoothing and output-expansion strategies in a highly seasonal and risky 
environment? Special attention must be devoted to a comparison of deposit instruments 
(col}tractual, forced, voluntary) and their adjustment to the demands for reserve holding and 
liquidity management of the clienteles in this market niche. 
( c) How have the financial technologies of these organizations and their use of existing village 
arrangements facilitated the solution of information and contract enforcement problems in 
lending in low-income village societies? How sustainable are these village-based arrangements 
as structural change takes place in these societies? 
( d) WHat levels of financial sustainability are being achieved by these organizations and what 
explains differences in their success in this endeavor? What types of challenges must be 
overcome to achieve sustainability in this market niche? 
(e) How have the ownership and governance structures of these organizations been established 
at both the first-tier and second-tier levels and how have these structures facilitated: 
(i) ! 
(ii), 
' (iii) 
(iv) 
cost-effective savings-deposit mobilization, 
protection of depositors in the absence of an external prudential regulatory 
framework, 
a high loan recovery record, and 
effective management of outside funds. 
4 
(f) Whal have been the role and the style of the external technical assistance provided to these 
systdms? What provisions are being made to leave a sustainable central support when the 
outsi~e organizations leave? 
D. Sele+tion of the Organizations 
I 
Th~rganizations considered for this case study were selected because they reflect new 
microfinanc mechanisms commonly found in West African countries. Some of the specific 
organizatio were chosen to build upon earlier research on their performance. A description of each 
program sel . cted is provided in the following chapters. 
' I 
The I choice of an example of the CIDR-sponsored caisse villageoises was directed to the 
Pays Dogon Mali, where this program has achieved its greatest level of maturity. The credit union 
movement in Niger was selected since it highlights the new kind of WOCCU-type cooperatives that 
are attempf ng to innovate and adapt to their local environments. The choice of village banking 
programs fo used on initiatives sponsored by CRS, Freedom from Hunger, and Save the Children 
because the have each introduced important innovations to the FINCA village banking model to 
adapt it to African environment and to address shortcomings of the original model. Several of 
these innova~ons have been adopted by the programs in Benin and Mali chosen for this case study. 
E. Dat and Methodology 
The nformation reported in this case study comes in part from materials collected during 
earlier Wes African research at OSU as well as through recent documents from sponsoring 
organizatio such as CIDR and WOCCU. Interviews and documents collected during recent field 
visits also rovided information on these programs.6 Field trips were taken in November and 
December 1997 to Benin and Mali, to assess the current status, organizational structure, and the 
lending tee ologies that generate outreach for the caisses villageoises and for several US-based-
NGO villag banking programs. 
I 
The !visit to the caisses villageoises of the Pays Dogon in Mali focused on gathering 
information Ion the role and activities of the technical unit (Service Commun) and the regional 
associations by interviewing staff members and elected officials at the headquarters in the town of 
Koro. Several caisses villageoises were visited to gain insight into the role of the members of 
managementlcommittees as well as the extent of villager participation in the operations and control 
of the caisse villageoises. This trip gathered information to complement what was already available 
from a previ us impact study undertaken by OSU (Ouattara et al., 1997). 
6 The field trips were taken in late 1997 by Korotoumou Ouattara, then Research Specialist 
with the Rural Finance Program at the Ohio State University, who already had ample 
expe ience in the region. This revised version has not updated the information, which 
repr sents the situation of the organizations at the time of the visits. 
5 
Three village banking programs were visited, one in Benin and two in Mali. In Benin, the field 
work focused on the CRS village banking activities implemented through several local NGOs. After 
meeting with CRS staff in Cotonou, to get an overview of the programs, three partner NGOs 
(CREDESA, GRAPAD, and CERIDAA) were also visited in Benin. 
CREDESA operates 24 village banks, GRAP AD operates 19 village banks, and CERIDAA 
operates 24 Village banks, of which 16 are CRS-sponsored. While visiting the local NGOs, meetings 
were held with the management to learn more about the organization and operations of the NGO, its 
mission, antl principal activities, including the village banking program and all its components. 
Discussions centered on the role of the NGOs vis-a-vis the village banks, the nature of their assistance 
and supervision, their savings, deposit and loan policies, as well as the technical assistance received 
from CRS.; Several village banks were subsequently visited to talk to the members and gain their 
insights, assess the level of their involvement in management, and find out how the members 
implement the concept of joint liability in their financial activities. 
The' two village banking programs visited in Southern Mali were associated with Freedom 
from Hunger in Koutiala and Save the Children in Kolondieba. Freedom from Hunger operates its 
village banking program in collaboration with the Kafo Jiginew credit union network, whose staff 
were interviewed both about the program and their regular credit union activities. Subsequently, 
several village banking groups or associations, as they are called in this program, were visited to 
obtain additional information regarding the members' involvement and aspirations. 
Save the Children operates its program under the name of Group Guarantee Lending and 
Savings (GGLS). Discussions with staff members at CRS in Kolondieba revealed that some GGLS 
units were aiso members of a network of embryonic credit unions in those places where a local credit 
union already existed while other GGLS units were not. Several credit unions with GGLS 
membership were visited as well as stand-alone GGLS units. Discussions with members allowed the 
researcher' to learn how the groups had been organized and were run and about plans for future 
expans10n. 
All'the organizations were remarkably generous with their time and cooperation. The staff 
kindly proVided logistical support when needed, arranged interviews with partners and members, and 
made existing documentation available. 
F. Co~tents 
In 'addition to this introduction, the document contains six chapters. Chapter II briefly 
describes the environment in which these organizations operate. Chapter III analyzes key issues 
related to the performance of some examples of these three types of mutualist organizations. These 
issues inchide the nature of their financial technologies, strategies for deposit mobilization, outreach, 
sustainability, governance arrangements, and linkages to organizational structures. Lessons learnt 
from this cbmparative analysis are highlighted. Chapter IV describes the caisses villageoises program 
in the Dogbn region of Mali. Chapter V is devoted to the Niger credit union program, and Chapter 
VI describes village banking programs developed by US-based NGOs in Benin and Mali. Some 
policy recommendations and a review of outstanding issues are offered. 
6 
II 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
All the organizations visited for this case study operate in West Africa, an environment where 
low incomes and high risks are the norm. Although the obstacles to the expansion of microfmance 
in these environments are formidable, West Africa has been rapidly becoming an important laboratory 
for microfiniance experiments. 
This expansion of microfmance in West Africa has followed the widespread failure of 
developmenk finance institutions and state-owned commercial banks along with the first generation 
of World Bank-sponsored micro and small enterprise fmance projects in the 1980s. Only private 
(mostly for~ign) commercial banks remain in operation in the formal fmancial system and, with the 
exception oft mobilizing some small urban deposits, these banks ignore microfinance, particularly in 
the rural areas. Mutualist organizations are among the most important new actors in this market 
niche. 
Three new types of microfinance initiatives currently attempt to reach the poor in these 
countries: ! 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Gr~een-Bank replications and other group-loan programs, including Sahel Action in 
Burfna Faso. These efforts are not discussed in this case study.' 
Mutualist initiatives that emphasiz.e loans to individuals. These initiatives are apparently more 
sucJessful than those employing group lending technologies, such as the Grameen Bank 
I 
replications, but they have received much less attention. They represent an institutional 
al~rrative both to commercial banks and to financial NGOs. They emphasize deposits along 
wi~ loan services and rely on individual rather than the group lending technologies based on 
joint liability. They include organizations such as the caisses villageoises and the credit 
unilns. 
i 
Village banking systems that have adapted FINCA-style lending technologies and that have 
introduced major additional innovations to the original model. Several of these programs are 
sponsored by US-based NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services, Freedom from Hunger, and 
Save the Children. They combine some features of (a) and (b ), and in some cases they have 
linkfd their activities to credit unions. 
This case study contrasts traditional mutualist organizations with the better-known village 
banking sy~tems sponsored by US-based NGOs, in an effort to derive lessons for the sustainability 
of village baruang in general. 
I 
7 For la detailed discussion see Paxton (1997) and Nguyen (1998). 
7 
Table 1. Socioeconomic and Financid Market Indicators for Benin, Mali, and Niger for 
Selected Years in the Past Decade. 
Benin Mali Niger 
GNP per capita in 1996 (US$) 370 250 220 
GDP per capita in 1996 (US$) 418 240 222 
Real GDP ~ate of growth in 1996 (%) 5.5 4.0 3.6 
Average inflation rate for 1990-96 (%) 9.7 5.8 6.5 
Bank discohnt rate in 1996 (%) 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Money mru:ket rate in 1996 (%) 11.4 11.4 11.4 
Deposit interest rate for 1992 (%) a 7.8 7.8 7.8 
Lending interest rate for 1992 (% )b 16.8 16.8 16.8 
Exchange rate of the CF AF in 1996b 511.5 511.5 511.5 
Socioeconomic indicators in 1996: 
I 
Population (million) 5.6 10.8 9.2 
Population density (per square mile) 4.4 8.0 7.0 
Rutal population (%) 69 73 83 
Rural dependency ratioc 51 51 n.a. 
Rural population in absolute poverty during 65 60 35 
1980-90 (%) 
Urban population in absolute poverty during n.a. 27 n.a. 
1980-90 (%) 
I 
Adµlt female literacy (%) 19 17 5 
Adult male literacy rate (%) 42 32 18 
Life expectancy at birth for 1990-95 (years) 47.6 46.0 46.5 
Source: I.t\1F Statistics and World Resources 
Notes: a: The latest statistics available from the IMF were for 1992. There is usually a 4-5 
percentage point spread between the discount rate and both the deposit and the 
lending rates. 
b: . Official exchange rate of the CF AF, which is pegged to the French Franc, in US 
dollars. Beginning on January 12, 1994, the CFA Franc (CFAF) was devalued t> 
CF AF 100 per French Franc from CF AF 50 at which it had been fixed since 1948. 
c: , Dependent population, ages over 15 and less than 65, as a percentage of the potential 
labor force, ages 15 to 65. 
n.a. not available. 
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A. Socioeconomic Features 
The organizations selected for this case study operate in one of three West African countries, 
namely Bertin, Mali, and Niger. These three countries share much in common besides their 
geographic location (Table 1 ): 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
B. 
These countries are among the poorest in the world, as reflected by a GNP per capita between 
US$220 and US$370. 
I 
These countries have rapidly growing populations, at rates averaging 3 percent per year, while 
rates of real GDP growth remain at less than 6 percent per year. Poverty is widespread. 
Popttlation density is low, ranging from 4 people per square mile in Benin to 7 in Niger and 
8 in Mali. This low density of population increases the costs of microfinance organizations. 
The brai population in these countries exceeds 70 percent of their total population. Among 
the rural population, between 35 and 65 percent live in absolute poverty. This rural 
population faces numerous sources of uncertainty and risk in a fragile environment. Coping 
with!risk and consumption smoothing are at the core of their economic activities. 
Lev~ls of education are low. The adult literacy rate is low, ranging between 18 and 42 
percent for males and even lower (5 to 19 percent) for women. Low levels of education also 
constraint the emergence of formal financial contracts. 
lnflatlon has not been a problem in these countries, which are all under structural adjustment 
programs. Thus, between 1990 and 1996, the average inflation rate was less than 10 percent 
per year. This low inflation rate can be attributed to the strict monetary rules that these 
countries follow under the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA). 
Fin~ncial Markets 
Financial markets in these three countries are characterized by the limited outreach of the 
commercial panking system, which operates with a high urban bias. Banks are located in the capital 
city, with jJst a few or no branches at all in the rural areas. Thus, rural people (over 60 percent of 
the population) have limited or no access to formal financial services. 
1. Mali 
The1financial system of Mali is still rudimentary, even by African standards. For 1995, the 
conventional financial deepening indicator (M2/GDP) was only 22 percent compared to other West 
African countries for which this indicator ranged from 18 to 30 percent. There are a few commercial 
banks, including the Bank of Africa and the Banque Malienne pour le Commerce et le Developpe-
ment (BMCb). Development banks include the Banque de Developpement du Mali (BDM) and the 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole (BNDA). All commercial banks have few or no 
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branches in the rural areas. Only the BNDA maintains some business relationships with other semi-
formal orga.t!lizations (such as the caisses villageoises) located in the rural areas. 
I 
The 1semi-formal finance world of Mali is dominated by microfinance organizations. The 
oldest of these organizations were created in 1986, including the caisses villageoises in the Dog on 
region and the Kafo Jiginew credit union network. In 1996, there were 24 registered microfinance 
organizatioJllS with 160,000 members, CF AF 5 billion (US$ 10 million) in mobilized deposits and 
CF AF 5.8 billion (US$ 11.4 million) in loans, of which CF AF 21 billion (US$ 4.2 million) came from 
the bankin~ sector. These microfmance organizations were able to reach only 3 percent of the 
working population in Mali (Chao-Beroff and Ellsasser, 1997). 
2. ' Niger 
The formal financial sector of Niger has a history of failures of financial institutions one after 
the other. Ip 1990, the Banque de Developpement de la Republique du Niger (BDRN) collapsed, 
followed b~ the Credit du Niger (CN) and the agricultural bank, the Caisse Nationale du Credit 
Agricole (CNCA). The Nigeria International Bank (NIB) had closed its Maradi office in 1987. Three 
commercial1 banks failed between 1988 and 1992: the Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et 
l'lndustrie ;du Niger (BICI-N), the Banque de Credit et de Commerce (BCC), a subsidiary of the 
infamous B$1k of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), and the Banque lslamique du Niger 
(BIN), whicih closed in February 1992. 
To4y, existing commercial banks in Niger have a strong urban bias. They are all located in 
Niamey, th~ capital, and they have just a few or no branches in rural areas. The involvements of 
commercial banks with the agricultural world remains very limited. In fact, financial deepening 
indicators fdr Niger are the lowest among Francophone African countries. The only financial system 
that serves the rural sector via branches throughout the country is the credit union network sponsored 
by WOCCV, jointly with a few other donor-funded programs. 
3. i Benin 
In 1990, the fmancial market of Benin underwent a complete restructuring, shortly after the 
country abaµdoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology. The restructuring of Benin's state-owned banking 
sector gave pse to a formal financial sector of five private commercial banks. These are the Banque 
Internationale du Benin (owned by a syndicate of four Nigerian banks), Ecobank, Bank of Africa, 
Financial B~ (Lebanese and Swiss owned), and Credit Lyonnais (French ownership). These banks 
all operate. in major urban areas and have few or no branches in rural areas. The national savings 
bank and ppstal checking service have wider outreach but offer limited deposit and loan services. 
I 
When the Banque Beninoise pour le Developpement and the Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole (CNCA), which had been set up to disburse long-term and agricultural loans, were 
liquidated fu 1990, the government withdrew from the management of fmancial intermediaries and 
replaced iliP old system with credit unions or caisses locales de credit agricole mutuel (CLCAM). 
By December 1997, over 200,000 people were members of a credit union network made up ofa 
federation icalled FECECAM (Federation des Caisses d'Epargne et de Credit Mutuel) and 82 
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CLCAMs operating all over the country. This made FECECAM the largest credit union network in 
Francopho1'e Africa. 
In sl!lmmary, after a major crisis in Benin, there is now renewed faith in the financial system 
in general apd there are increasingly active semi-formal and informal financial markets. The semi-
formal system is dominated by credit unions and other mutualist financial organizations, eager to fill 
the gap left 1by commercial banks not able or not willing to serve the rural population and the poor 
in general. bther players in the microfinance world, such as international projects and programs as 
well as NGbs, are also trying to share a market of at least 60 percent of the population. 
Th~ informal financial sector remains the province of tontines and moneykeepers and 
moneylend¢rs throughout these countries. Unfortunately, most NGOs show a crucial lack of 
expertise and capacity to engage in successful financial intermediation. All these factors explain the 
importance bf the challenge facing micro finance organizations that choose to work with the poor in 
the rural aileas. Despite these obstacles, mutualist organizations have managed to achieve some 
success, reaching the poor while remaining sustainable. 8 
I 
c. I Th~ PARMEC Law 
Thtountries covered by this study are members of the Franc Zone and of the West African 
Monetary nion, the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). This group 
includes seven francophone countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, 
all of whic~ use the CFA franc (CFAF) as their currency. The CFA franc is pegged to the French 
Franc (FF),1 with a fixed parity rate of 100 CF AF per 1 FF, following the devaluation of the currency 
in January 11994.9 
I 
Th~ Union was created in 1962 and includes a regional Central Bank, the Banque Centrale 
des Etats de l 'Afrique de / 'Ouest (BCEAO), located in Dakar, Senegal, with national branches in 
member suttes. Monetary policy, interest rates, currency and trading regulations in these UEMOA 
countries are controlled and determined by the country's membership in the Franc Zone. Exchange 
controls apply to all currencies other than the CF A franc and French franc. This situation makes it 
imperative tO discuss this regulatory environment since the mutualist organizations studied here are 
subject to lhis regime. 
Approved as early as 1994 by some countries, including Mali, a new law regulating mutualist 
organiz.atioins was enacted by the BCEAO. The PARMEC law has been intended to provide a legal 
8 
9 
Giten great difficulties in defining and in measuring sustainability, this report uses the term 
sustainability in a broad and lax sense. Most of the organizations observed would not pass 
rigbrous tests of sustainability but they have, so far, shown a better performance than their 
predecessors. 
I 
suice 1948, the CFA Franc was pegged to the French Franc for 26 years at FF 1 = FCF A 50, 
before the devaluation of 1994. 
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framework for mutualist organizations and savings and credit cooperatives including their unions and 
I 
federations. The P ARMEC law does not apply to tontines or other informal savings groups, but 
these groups are free to apply for recognition under the law. Other microfinance organizations that 
are not of a mutualist or cooperative type are not subject to the law. These types of organizations 
will be regulated under each country's separate banking laws. 
Mutualist organizations under the P ARMEC law must meet the following criteria: 
(a) membership must be free and voluntary, 
(b) mei:µbership size is not limited, 
( c) a democratic structure must prevail, following the one-person, one-vote principle, 
( d) shott-term assets must at all times be at least 80 percent of short-term liabilities, 
(e) the ~oan portfolio must not exceed twice the total amount of members' deposits, 
(f) a loan to a single member must not exceed 10 percent of the value of all members' deposits, 
(g) loans to board members cannot exceed 20 percent of the value of all members' deposits, 
(h) poqfolio at risk must not exceed 5 percent of the total loan portfolio, and 
(i) at l~ast 15 percent of the annual operating surplus must be kept as a reserve. 
I 
Unc;ler the P ARMEC law, mutualist organizations have their name protected and benefit from 
tax exemptions. The organizations, however, are also subject to a more restrictive usury law. This 
law establishes interest rate ceilings on credit. At the end of 1997 it was still unclear whether this 
ceiling or cap would be equal to twice the discount rate or set according to some other formula. In 
1996 this formula would have allowed the organizations to charge up to 30 percent nominal annual 
interest rates on loans. The usury rate was lowered to 27 percent in 1997. At this rate, not many 
microfinanoe organizations would have been able to cover their costs. Final details were still being 
worked out. 
It is worth noting that the P ARMEC law was drafted with funding from the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), with the technical assistance of Developpement 
International Desjardins (DID), the leading Canadian credit union organization. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the law emulates features that are prominent in credit unions and credit cooperatives 
in general. Although the P ARMEC law may fit mutualist organizations, it should be recognized that 
it remains silent on the regulation of other forms of microfinance organizations. In this connection, 
each coun1Jry has been left free to set its own laws or no law at all for non-mutualist organizations. 
This omission is not a cause for serious concern, however, while the potentially repressive 
features of the P ARMEC law are. While a prudential regulation and supervision framework is 
recommended for deposit-taking organizations, the urge to regulate all microfinance organizations 
without a 1clear understanding of the effects of regulation may lead to counter-productive results 
(Gonzalez+.Vega, 1998c). 
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D. Assessment 
In summary, the mutualist micro finance organizations reviewed in this case study operate in 
a difficult environment. While widespread poverty in these West African countries creates unsatisfied 
demands for financial services, all transactions are very small. The small size of the transactions and 
the inadequate physical and institutional infrastructures increase transaction costs for all market 
participants. Moreover, seasonal patterns, uncertainty, and high risks further conspire against the 
emergence pf insurance and financial markets. It is not surprising, therefore, that formal financial 
markets are shallow and that they lack particularly in rural depth. While price stability helps, the 
recent rigid and potentially repressive norms of the PARMEC law, not matter how well-intended, will 
not contribute much to rural financial deepening. The most promising initiatives are, instead, the 
innovations and hard work in the field displayed by the organizations discussed in this report and their 
efforts to ~ncorporate features of informal institutions in their financial technologies and 
organizational design. 
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III 
KEY ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR VILLAGE BANKS 
This comparative analysis of client-owned microfinance organizations in West Africa has 
identified a number of key issues. Analysis of these issues can lead to lessons for village banking 
programs in West Africa, as they evolve into larger-scale, fully-functional and sustainable financial 
intermediaries. Five key issues of general interest are: 
(a) the kppropriateness of their financial technologies; 
(b) their strategies for deposit mobilization; 
( c) the degree of outreach and sustainability of these organizations; 
( d) their property rights and governance structures; and 
( e) theif linkages and leveraging. 
A. Financial Technology 
Lending technologies refer to the actions, tools and procedures used by microfinance 
organizatiqns to reduce expected losses from default and to accomplish this at a reasonable cost 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998b ). These tasks involve screening applicants, designing contracts and choosing 
terms and conditions for different classes of clients, monitoring borrowers, signaling the seriousness 
of the organization, and enforcing contracts. 
All pf these mutualist organizations rely heavily on their proximity to the clientele to screen 
and monitor borrowers and on combinations of formal and informal mechanisms to enforce their 
contracts. The differences in their lending technologies described below have implications for the 
breadth, depth, and quality of their outreach, namely for their ability to offer valuable services to large 
number of their target clienteles. 
I 
1. Individual versus group loans 
The caisses villageoises and West African credit unions use a lending technology mostly 
based on individual loans, whereas the village banks use some form of group lending. What this 
means is thtt, although village bank members may receive either individual or group loans, these are 
guaranteed by some form of joint liability, while this is not the case in the other organizational types. 
Granting loans to individuals means that the caisses villageoises and the credit unions have to rely 
on physical assets and other forms of collateral for contract enforcement, while the village banks rely 
on group lift.bility and peer monitoring for loan repayment. This may raise issues about differences 
in depth of outreach (Gonzalez-Vega, 1998c). 
The caisses villageoises, using an individual-loan technology, ask for physical collateral such 
as tools and equipment, animals, jewelry, and expensive clothing items for women. This is not a 
major barr~er, however, as most residents of the village possess some of these assets, but the value 
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of these ass~ts does constrain the size of the loans granted. Indeed, collateral has to be adapted to 
the local environment, and the assets pledged must represent something the borrower highly values. 
Mor¢over, borrowers who belong to a different village are subject to more stringent rules than 
residents of the village where the caisse villageoise operates, whereby a guarantor is required in 
addition to physical collateral. The guarantor has to be a member of the caisse and live in the village 
where the catsse is located. In this fashion, the managers of the caisse are protected because in this 
fashion they enlists additional screening and monitoring agents, by adding another layer of control 
through a pdrson whom they know well and to whom they have easy access. 
Vill~ge groups can deposit funds at the caisses villageoises but they cannot be granted loans. 
Village institµtions, such as indigenous village groups and village chiefs play, however, an important 
role in tasks such as acquiring and sharing information on potential borrowers and facilitating contract 
enforcement on behalf of the caisse. 
I 
Cred/itunions in Niger largely use an individual-loan technology. Nevertheless, some credit 
unions such 6 those belonging to FECECAM in Benin and the Kafo Jiginew in Mali provide loans 
to membe~ of groups. All of these organizations require a variety of collateral, which includes 
pledges of land and physical assets such as tools and implements, a third-party guarantor, or the 
group's joint liability. 
vmake banking programs in West Africa use some variation of a group lending technology. 
Groups are lformed by people, usually women, who live in the same village or town. Since it is 
difficult for iµembers of large groups of 30-60 women to be intimately connected, solidarity groups 
of six people on average are typically formed within each village bank. These six individuals know 
each other well and can monitor each other easily. Group liability is used as a collateral substitute and 
as a mecruu$m for contract enforcement. Loan monitoring is, therefore, performed by members of 
the group, \\fho use peer pressure for loan repayment and who can exclude members who default on 
their loan from the group, as is the case for the programs visited in Mali and Benin. 
! 
BotJii the individual and group loan technologies have proven effective in ensuring 
comparatively high repayment rates of more than 95 percent of amounts due. Some village banks 
have realize(!, however, that smaller groups of six people who know each other well are better for 
monitoring 1purposes than large groups of 30-60 people. This is an important innovation over the 
original village banking model, which was applied to individuals within the village bank. 
I 
Vilhjtge banking practitioners like the group lending technology because it allows poorer 
people with ho physical collateral to get a loan. As village bank members develop a relationship with 
the organizaJ:ion and acquire more assets through a number of loan cycles, however, they may value 
the opportwµty to gain access to individual loans against traditional forms of collateral, as is practiced 
by the cais$es villageoises. Although this innovation has not been adopted by the village banking 
programs '1isited, if it were feasible it may represent an interesting albeit challenging next step for 
these organiptions. Joint liability may still be a cost-effective mechanism to grant very small loans. 
I 
2. Flexible versus fixed loan terms and conditions 
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There are notable differences in the terms and conditions of the loans granted across these 
organiz.ations. These terms and conditions and their adaptation to actual client demands determine 
the quality pf the services offered. 
Loan products are particularly attractive at the caisses villageoises. These organizations do 
not link savings-deposits to loans and do not target loans to particular uses. They provide small loans 
to rural households at positive real rates of interest. There is not a uniform interest rate structure 
across these1 organiz.ations and the rates can be changed during general village assemblies. The caisses 
villageoises do not have an explicit loan size criterion either. The value of collateral determines 
whether borrowers get the amount they request. There is a general understanding, however, that a 
single loan amount to any individual should not exceed 10 percent of the total loan portfolio. 
Terrins to maturity of most loans at the caisses villageoises do not exceed one year and loan 
sizes are rather small, averaging US$ 99 in 1996. This was equivalent to 40 percent of GDP per 
capita in Mali. The average term to maturity is six months, and repayments are due as a balloon 
payment at the end of the loan cycle for farmers whose income flows are irregular and very seasonal. 
Terms are ~horter and loan repayments more regular (weekly or monthly) for traders. Thus, these 
organiz.atiorts respond with diverse products to the diverse demands for financial services from their 
clientele. This responsiveness is valuable, given the features of the environment. 
In credit unions, access to a loan is tied to the individual's savings, although the loan-to-
savings ratiqs differ from one credit union to another. The lower the loan-to-savings coefficient, the 
higher the ifnplicit effective interest rate charged. Loan sizes averaged US$ 190 in Niger in 1996, 
equivalent to 73 percent of GDP per capita in that country. Terms to maturity depend on the loan 
products offered. Repayment schedules include installments as well as balloon payments. Short-term 
loans average six months, while equipment loans carry longer terms, averaging two years. Such long 
terms are n<;>t offered by the other types of microfinance organizations. Although interest rates are 
positive in real terms, they vary across credit unions and even within each one of the networks 
operating in Niger. Interest rates cannot be changed unilaterally by individual credit unions. 
In village banks, there is typically a formal limit on the size of the loans, which introduces 
some rigidity. Loan cycles usually last 16 weeks, with equal installments paid weekly, bi-weekly, or 
monthly. Thus, terms to maturity are also inflexible. Village bank practitioners believe in instigating 
a regular repayment habit in their borrowers to avoid default. These payments occur at regular 
meetings, where the whole membership becomes a witness to the transaction and where peer pressure 
is exercised. 
I 
These programs do not encourage loans for agriculture, which require a longer gestation 
period and depend on seasonal income flows. Loans are targeted instead to microenterprise activities 
(mostly trading), which generate regular cash flows, compatible with the program's repayment 
schedule. I1terest rates are positive in real terms and meant to promote operational self-sufficiency. 
They are set by the implementing agency and cannot be changed unilaterally. The members sometimes 
freely set, however, the interest rates to be charged on loans from the internal account of the village 
bank. 
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One challenge for village banks may be that by setting a maximum loan amount for its 
members, they may induce some, e.g., its older members, to quit the organization when they reach 
the ceiling. lf village banks want to transform themselves into sustainable organizations, they must 
adapt to the growing demands and wealth of their membership, provided they can secure the larger 
loans with acceptable collateral. It is not clear if these revisions are compatible with the overall 
village banking technology and with efforts to keep costs low. 
The 1caisses villageoises and the credit unions do not target their loans to specific uses and 
are thereby able to address the demands of a broader clientele, including farmers. Given the fungibility 
of funds and the multiple occupations of West African households, it is difficult to identify the actual 
use of borrowed funds. It is possible, therefore, that funds from all of these organizations are being 
used in farming, given the importance of this occupation in these countries. Contract terms that are 
adjusted to agricultural occupations make the loans riskier for the lender but valued by the clients. 
' 
3. Mechanisms to collect information and ensure contract enforcement 
One attribute of member-owned, village-based organizations is that they possess a 
comparativ9 advantage over remote commercial banks in collecting information about the borrowers. 
This advantage comes from the fact that they are located in the same place where their borrowers live 
and work; i. ~., they operate in villages that are fairly small ( 400 adults on average) and where family 
and social t~es are strong. 
In tPese villages, people know each other well and information is readily accessible and 
verifiable using family members, friends, neighbors, and members of the same indigenous group as 
the borrower. This information advantage lowers the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers. 
When the organization extends its operations beyond the boundaries of a single village or is located 
in a larger t6wn, these information economies decline and lending strategies must change. Thus, for 
example, for borrowers who do not live in the village, the caisses villageoises require that they 
provide a guarantor who is a local resident. 
' 
One important element in the financial technology of the caisses villageoises is the explicit 
use of village arrangements to facilitate the solution of information and contract enforcement 
problems. Village institutions, such as indigenous groups and the village chief, play an important role 
in several ,aspects of the operations of the caisses villageoises. Indigenous village groups are 
organized ailong gender and/or age lines. These groups engage in income-earning activities such as 
the construction of houses and granaries for a fee and the planting and harvesting of a common field. 
The proce~ds from these activities are usually kept at the group level and used to make loans to 
members. 1These funds are frequently deposited at the caisse villageoise. 
FirSt, the village chief is always consulted before the office for the caisse it built, and later on 
he serves 'lS a contract-enforcement resource. This is part of the chiefs traditional role in conflict 
resolution within the village. Second, indigenous village groups that are members of the caisse are 
also enlisted to monitor their members on behalf of the caisse. Indigenous village groups have an 
I 
incentive to monitor individual caisse borrowers because they deposit large amounts of money with 
the organization (Ouattara et al., 1997). 
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Management committee members are chosen by all villagers in an open assembly. The men 
and women who are selected to run the organization are trustworthy people who have demonstrated 
some leade~ship skills. They also know that they will be subject to village-wide scrutiny. In tre 
caisses villageoises, therefore, contract enforcement is obtained not only through the use of collateral 
but also through village-wide monitoring of the borrowers and by resorting to the authority of the 
chief if necessary. These mechanisms have so far been effective in keeping default at low levels. 
The credit unions and village banks also incorporate village-level infonnation in their decisions 
and also possess contract-enforcement advantages over other formal intermediaries. Thus, some 
credit unions, such as the Kafo Jiginew in Mali, use market groups to screen potential borrowers and 
some village banks use ROSCAs to fonn their groups. Jo The use of these established informal groups 
in village banking is not systematic, however, and although market groups are commonly used in 
Mali, credit unions in Niger do not rely on village groups to screen their borrowers. In the village 
banks, nevertheless, members of the group (rather than the community at large) are expected to offer 
peer screening and monitoring. When joint liability is enforced, group members have a strong 
incentive to :be diligent in this task. 
Thus, at the caisses villageoises, borrower monitoring is performed both by the management 
committee members and by all villagers. At the credit unions, monitoring is the responsibility of the 
loan managers. In village banks, loan monitoring relies on group members, who use peer pressure 
for loan repayment and who can exclude a member who defaults on her loan. The caisses 
villageoises have an easier time monitoring their loans, because the whole village is involved and 
because loans are backed by tangible assets pledged as collateral. This advantage cannot be exercised, 
however, in larger urban settings. Village banking programs, in turn, find it more effective to monitor 
loans throu9h smaller groups of people who know each other well, such as solidarity groups. This 
is a substitute for physical assets pledged as collateral. 
At the caisses villageoises, loan default is handled by seizing the borrower's collateral after 
all other means of contract enforcement have failed. This frequently relies on involving family 
members ar).d is carried out with the agreement of the village chief. The formal judicial system is 
rarely used ~ecause it would not be practical. In contrast, the credit unions do rely more on the legal 
system and on group pressure when needed to deal with loan default. With village banking programs, 
any loan default results in all members of the organization being penalized by loss of access to 
additional funds. Thus, village bank members rely on each other to repay loans due, but a defaulter 
may ultimately be excluded from the village bank and from all access to future loans. 
In some programs, village bank members are individually responsible for repayment of their 
loans. These borrowers are allowed to take only the amount they can afford to repay. If members 
of the village bank come to the rescue of a defaulter, they expect to be paid back. If defaulters do 
not have valid reasons for their behavior, they are barred from the group. To this extent, some West 
Jo See 1 Chapter VI for a discussion of village banking programs and the Kafo Jiginew credit 
union network in Mali. 
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African ~e banks have incorporated features of individual-loan technologies. Where this is the 
case, the trapsition to individual loans backed by collateral should not be too difficult in the future. 
i 
In stjmmary, all three types of organization use some informal village institutions to minimize 
the costs of addressing information problems and improve contract enforcement. The caisses 
villageoisesl relay on groupements villageois (indigenous village groups) for monitoring purposes. 
Some villag~ banks use ROSCA members to form their groups. The Kafo Jiginew credit unions in 
Mali use as~ociations villageoises (village associations) to recruit the first members of their village 
banks and ~y on the associations as a contract enforcement mechanism. These organizations have 
realized that village institutions possess a wealth of information that can be used to minimize moral 
hazard and facilitate contract enforcement. They all have, to some extent, incorporated village 
informatio and contract enforcement elements in their lending technologies. 
4. Optimum size of village-based organizations 
The ptimum size of any organization is determined by the point \\here the costs of expansion 
outweigh th benefits of mobilizing more deposits from members who reside outside the village. As 
these org izations grow and reach more distant clients, however, their information and contract 
enforcemen advantages decline. 
aisses villageoises and credit unions usually incorporate several villages into one local 
organizatio . This creates monitoring and contract enforcement problems when the borrowers do 
not reside here the organization is located. Serving only people from the same village would 
alleviate th costs of gathering information for screening and monitoring, but it would reduce the 
breadth of utreach of the organization and prevent the exploitation of economies of scale. The 
solution to · s trade-off depends on the nature of the lending technology. These organizations use 
a technolo y that relies heavily on local information. This constrains their growth potential. The 
issue is delic te, because the population excluded from villages where there is no caisse tends to be 
poorer than e population of villages with caisses. 
Vill ge banks tend to restrict their membership to a maximum of 60 people and have realized 
that even s ch a number may be too large for proper loan monitoring. Thus, a solution has been 
found in fo ing smaller solidarity groups of six people, who have an easier time monitoring each 
other, wi · the larger village bank group. This adjustment to the original village banking model is 
an importan innovation. 
I 
I 
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B. Deppsit Mobilization 
1. Forced versus voluntary savings 
The caisses villageoises, credit unions, and village banks all mobilize savings-deposits from 
their clients, but in doing so they follow different approaches. While the caisses villageoises attract 
voluntary deposits, the credit unions and village banks include forced savings in their deposit 
mobilization practices. The borrowers' savings are thus captured by tying loans to deposits and by 
requiring a ¢ontribution to a guarantee fund, which is a percentage of the loan amount disbursed. 
This practiqe in effect raises the effective cost of the loans for the borrowers, as the net amount 
borrowed isl lower than the amount used to compute interest payments. 
! 
I 
The caisses villageoises have adopted a savings-first approach. They receive no endowment 
of funds to start their lending operations. During the first year of operations, for their loans they have 
to rely entirely on the mobilization of village savings. These are voluntary deposits. There are no 
forced savings at the caisses villageoises, and loan size is not linked to deposits. These are attractive 
practices. TI]e use of village savings for intermediation helps to avoid creating the image of hand outs 
that accom~anies the operation of some NGOs. More importantly, it acknowledges that access to 
voluntary deposit facilities represents a genuine service to the clients and contributes to true financial 
intermediatipn within the village. 
I 
The caisses villageoises mobilize voluntary deposits by offering attractive interest rates to 
savers and by ensuring the quality of services (i.e., safe and confidential accounts). They pay high 
positive interest rates in real terms (nominal rates reached 40 percent per year when inflation averaged 
6 percent from 1990-1996). These rates reflect the high opportunity cost of funds within the village. 
Attractive tmuneration of deposits creates a pool of net depositors, essential in true financial 
intermediat on. In fact, the caisses villageoises have been able to attract large depositors, mainly 
from inform l village groups and big traders. The average size of these large deposit accounts was 
US$ 275. i 
Individual deposit accounts are small. For large and small deposits, as of December 1996, 
the average balance was CFAF 62,500 (US$ 125). Voluntary deposits funded about two-thirds of 
the total loan portfolio of the caisses villageoises. The rest of the funds came from outside 
commercial sources such as the BNDA, the agricultural development bank of Mali. In general, the 
caisses vill~geoises try to match the term structure of their assets and the term structure of their 
liabilities at the level of the local organization, by matching longer-term deposits (3 -12 months) and 
disbursing srorter-term loans (1-9 months). 
I 
All caisses villageoises keep a gross intermediation margin of 18 to 30 percentage points, 
charging interest rates on loans of 36 to 60 percent per year. Interest rates can vary depending on 
the intermediation and operating costs of each organization and the costs of borrowing from external 
sources. This wide margin, compared to commercial banks, allows the caisses villageoises to cover 
all their cos~, including the payment of external auditing services, and still remain profitable. These 
profits are tded in ways that create compatible incentives for the officers of the organization and for 
the village ~ large to diligently engage in monitoring efforts. 
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Tuel caisses villageoises attract depositors by offering them the opportunity to choose among 
several prol:lucts to meet their demands. There are two basic types of products: 
(a) demand deposit accounts that earn no interest, and 
(b) term deposit accounts (3-12 months) that pay 18-30 percent annual interest rates. 
Tertn deposit accounts are by far the preferred accounts, and they attract more than two-
thirds of the total savings collected (Ouattara et al., 1997). This reflects the fact that economic 
I 
activities as !well as consumption patterns are seasonal in the Dogon region. The differential interest 
compensation is used to overcome a strong liquidity preference in a risky environment and allow the 
organization to match its loans with deposits of a longer maturity, thus resolving its liquidity 
managemett problems. 
The caisses villageoises also attract depositors by building a permanent and durable structure. 
The local office of the caisse is sometimes the only village structure with a tin roof. The safe, 
provided \1y the French sponsor, is located inside the building and protected by another door. 
Recently, the caisses have been upgrading their offices and reinforcing metal doors and windows, 
after several of them were broken into and the money stolen. These actions became necessary when 
the membe~ stopped depositing with the caisses that had been burglarized. This suggests that these 
organizations offer a useful safekeeping service in the village. A demand for this service explains the 
mobilizatio~ of non-interest-bearing deposit accounts, as long as safety is guaranteed. In summary, 
the caissd villageoises offer valuable voluntary deposit facilities to their members with deposit 
products that are safe, well-remunerated, and adapted to their demands. 
i 
Credit unions in Niger encourage voluntary savings-deposits but also practice forced savings, 
by requirin~ that a proportion of the loan be deposited as a guarantee. This practice increases the 
effective coSt of the loan. Moreover, the guarantee is not truly a protection against a borrower who 
intends to default, but it may help the credit union address liquidity crunches. In effect, a borrower 
with lack of willingness to repay would just take the net proceeds of the loan and leave the credit 
union. By 'lowering the net proceeds of the loan, however, this practice raises the effective cost of 
the funds and makes the loan products less attractive for the clients. 
I 
Individual members as well as groups can open a savings account at the local credit union. 
In addition ~ passbook savings accounts, since 1996 Niger credit unions have offered their members 
interest-bearing deposit accounts. Guaranty funds offered as collateral also earn interest. This lowers 
the impact ~f this requirement on the effective cost of the funds. Furthermore, members are rewarded 
at the end df the year when profits are distributed and each member receives a dividend proportional 
to the amount of savings held. 
ThJ interest-bearing deposit accounts introduced in 1996 were an effort by management to 
encourage
1 
savings and especially to attract more women, known to be a potential market of net 
savers. Wlten an organization relies heavily on deposits for its lending activity, it is essential to find 
ways to keep a continuous and even increasing flow of deposits to meet loan demand. This creates 
new attitudes among management. 
I 
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Village banks in West Africa encourage their members to voluntarily save with their programs, 
but they alsoi insist on collecting forced-deposits from the members. Voluntary deposit amounts are 
very small and are usually withdrawn at the end of each cycle. This may reflect the conflicting 
incentives that emerge when voluntary and forced deposits coexist. In this case, the organization is 
sending mixed signals. On the one hand, savings are a requirement that makes loans expensive 
(negative signal); on the other hand, deposit facilities are a valuable service (positive signal). It is 
difficult to simultaneously promote both. Ultimately, to encourage more voluntary deposits and to 
create a pool of net savers, village banks will have to revise their structure of incentives, including 
the quality of the services offered to depositors. This is not a trivial challenge and may be beyond the 
administrative capacity of many village banks. 
I 
The contrasts between organizations that practice forced savings versus those that offer 
voluntary deposits are striking. Organizations such as the caisses villageoises and the credit unions, 
which practice voluntary savings, devise ways and create products and mechanisms to attract 
depositors. This includes different deposit products at different terms to maturity and attractive 
interest rate~. To gain the respect and confidence of their depositors, these organizations need to 
meet a minimum set of requirements, such as a good physical structure that can resist theft and fire 
and other weather-related hazards and reliable safes. Good management of the loan portfolio is 
essential to ~ttract depositors. If there are voluntary depositors who can withdraw their savings, 
management will feel constrained and will be more prudent in their lending operations (Poyo, 
Gonzalez-Vega and Aguilera-Alfred, 1993). 
2. External funding 
One element that differentiates the caisses villageoises and credit unions from the village 
banks is the extent and nature of their reliance on external funding. The village banks start their 
program with external funds while the caisses villageoises and credit unions emphasize a savings-first 
approach. That is, in the early years of the organization, they exclusively rely on deposits. 
The caisses villageoises believe in instigating a savings habit among their members. It is also 
important td make villagers aware that the organization belongs to them. By the time the caisses 
villageoises gain access to outside funds, in an effort to meet increasing demands for their loans, the 
members are already convinced that they are mlrking with their own money and that they have to be 
disciplined irl their use of the loan funds. This allows these organizations to increase the supply of 
funds at the village level without skewing the positive role of depositors. 
The dxtemal funding approach of the village banks introduces another foreign element to the 
program in addition to the rules and regulations brought over by the foreign implementing agency. 
To rely on e~ternal funds for on-lending does not encourage savings by program members beyond 
those required for borrowing. Emphasis, instead, is placed on credit and, in the end, the programs 
tend to be supply-driven rather than demand-driven. It is true that members are required to 
accumulate $avings, but these funds represent a counterpart contribution to the loan (they are not 
more than guided self-financing); they are not funds intermediated from surplus to deficit units in the 
village. As a result, there is less intermediation of local funds than would be possible otherwise. 
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Vill~e banking programs do not necessarily have to rely on external funds for on-lending at 
the beginning of their operations. For example, the Freedom From Hunger (FFH) programs in West 
Africa workl in partnership with credit unions and other microfinance organizations, and FFH does 
not provide its programs with donor funds to be on-lent to members. This is a better approach than 
the original village banking model in promoting financial intermediation. 
Village banking programs have to realize, as do the caisses villageoises, the importance of 
deposit servibes for people living in risky environments. Liquid savings with a financial organization 
are frequently a better and safer alternative for these populations, who currently hold most of their 
assets in physical forms such as livestock. A drought might easily wipe out these physical assets, 
while financial assets will survive such negative shocks. In addition, the economic environment in 
West Africa is very suitable to the mobilization of financial savings, since it is a low inflation 
environment. Deposits largely maintain their real value from year to year and their liquidity is a 
valued attribµte. Most of these mutualist financial organizations have not yet captured the full savings 
potential of their clienteles. 
The bavings-first approach adds strength to the organizations practicing this strategy. Issues 
concerning the stability of member deposits and the cost-effectiveness of deposit mobilization need, 
however, to be recognized. 
Bec~use the caisses villageoises practice a savings-first approach, they are stronger 
organizations than otherwise, as members and especially depositors have a higher stake in their 
performance. They want to see the organization succeed and, therefore, they exercise more 
monitoring over the activities of its managers and the behavior of its borrowers. This improvement 
in internal control and in financial policies as a consequence of a stronger depositor presence has also 
been obserVed in credit unions elsewhere (Poyo, 1989). 
Monitoring both management and borrower behavior is in the best interest of depositors, who 
want their investments to be safe and profitable. Management will work to keep deposits and to 
attract new depositors by offering new and better products or, at least, maintaining the quality of 
existing products. Offering term deposit accounts, for example, ensures some stability of deposits, 
essential for. the strength of a savings-first organization. Management can also influence the behavior 
of depositori> to reduce the costs of deposit mobilization. Thus, a large number and amount of term 
deposit accounts relative to current and passbook accounts reduces the costs of mobilizing deposits, 
because thel costs of liquidity management are an important component of these costs and demand 
deposits pose greater liquidity-management challenges. Hence, cost-effective deposit mobilization 
depends on the management's willingness and ability to offer and manage deposit products that 
attract new members, are comparatively stable, and imply low handling costs. While the size of 
deposits in tpese organizations is small, which increases average costs, procedures are simple, which 
lowers costs. 
The potential impact of outside funds on the incentives for deposit mobilization should not 
be neglected. Outside funds can adversely affect deposit mobilization by reducing management 
incentives to pursue these funds in the local market. To prevent this, some precautions must be 
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taken. In the caisses vi/lageoises, for example, a local organization can have access to BNDA funds 
only if: 
(a) it has been in operation for at least one year, 
(b) it has high quality management, and 
( c) it has a loan default rate of less than 15 percent of the total portfolio. 
In addition, the amount of the BNDA loan to the caisse villageoise is a function of the 
amount of dt1IJOSits mobilized, i.e., the loan cannot exceed 150 percent of outstanding deposits during 
the first two years of operation and 200 percent thereafter. These conditions have apparently proven 
successful in avoiding a negative impact of BNDA funds on deposit mobilization. 
In addition, the BNDA funds are not grants but loans at 18 percent annual interest to the 
caisses villageoise, which in turn lends the funds to its members at its regular interest rates of 30 to 
60 percent. Thus, for the ultimate borrower, these are not subsidized funds and are not different in 
' price from loans based on deposits. The outside funds do not create, therefore, disincentives to 
repay. Rather, these outside funds have allowed the caisses villageoises to better meet an increasing 
demand for larger loan amounts and longer terms to maturity, which was not being met through 
mobilized d~osits alone. 
A potential lesson from this experience is that village banks may consider engaging in 
voluntary dei:)osit mobilization from the onset. Voluntary deposits provide strength and discipline to 
the organization, as depositors become interested in its performance and sustainability. To attract 
net savers, however, the organization must pay positive interest rates in real terms on deposits. Most 
important, ho\vever, is the safety of the funds, which requires adequate control mechanisms. To be 
able to offer safe services would be a major challenge for village banks. 
In contrast, to start operations exclusively with outside funding does not create sufficient 
incentives for
1
the early mobilization of voluntary deposits. Outside funds become necessary in poor 
environments, however, when credit demands grow, but only as a complement and not as a substitute 
for locally mdbilized funds. It appears that these outside funds can be incorporated without distorting 
incentives w4en the mobilization of local deposits is already well established. 
Village banks do mobilize savings from their members, but the regimented schedule of forced-
savings and tqe linkage of savings to loans reduces the value of the service for the client. Moreover, 
this mechanism is not adequate to attract a minimum mass of net depositors. Members in village 
banks currently participate because, given their alternatives, they are interested in the credit products 
of the village bank, not because they like the savings dimension. Even though a few may take 
advantage of voluntary deposit opportunities, which have been offered in some village banking 
programs, the design itself is not conducive to attracting members simply because they like tre 
deposit products, even when they may not be interested in loans. It is these pure depositors, 
nevertheless, who would become the best monitoring agents of the performance of the organization. 
They will not be attracted unless valuable deposit services, delinked from credit, are offered. This 
challenge may not be easy to address by village banking programs, given the rigid link betwem. 
savings and 16ans. 
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The experience of the caisses villageoises illustrates, moreover, that access to funds from 
outside the 
1 
village is valuable, given highly binding local wealth constraints in a risky environment. 
As a whole~ the village is a deficit unit and will attract funds from outside. The challenge is how to 
accomplish this without discouraging local deposit mobilization and, thereby, local intermediation. 
While the village as a whole is a deficit unit, some agents (such as some local groups) are surplus 
units and are willing to deposit independently of their demand for loans. 
It is not clear, however, if the limited extent to which even the caisses villageoises have 
succeeded in this effort is mostly a reflection of these wealth constraints or of cultural habits at the 
local level or if access to the BNDA funds has after all introduced some negative incentives for 
deposit mobilization. 
' 
If t:Qe necessary precautions are taken, it may be possible to successfully attract outside funds 
to complement available local deposit funds. For this task, village banks would have to provide some 
minimum logistical elements usually needed to mobilize deposits, such as a permanent physical 
infrastructfue made of durable and resistant material, a reliable safe, as well as a trustworthy and 
knowledgeable management committee backed by strong technical assistance from the implementing 
NGO. Some of these requirements go beyond the simple, standardized, and not-that-formal 
structures and procedures of village banking. To supply them may increase the costs of reaching 
these clienteles beyond reasonable levels. Linkages to other financial intermediaries may provide a 
means for addressing some of these challenges (Ouattara and Gonzalez-Vega, 1998). Only 
experiments such as those observed in West Africa can elucidate this empirical question. 
C. Outreach and Sustainability 
1. Outreach 
The caisses vil/ageoises, credit unions, and village banks aim at reaching the poor. Because 
of their different financial technologies, some of these organizations have been more successful than 
others in achieving sufficient breadth and depth of outreach. 
I 
By December 31, 1996 there were 21,950 members in 52 caisses villageoises in the Dogon 
region of Mali. Some of these organizations reached as many as 95 percent of the adult population 
of the village where they operate. Management committee members continuously work on the 
challenge of bringing more members to the organization. One reason for this extensive outreach is 
the community-oriented focus of the caisses villageoises, which allows all villagers to actively 
participate in the general meetings of the organization. Another reason is the focus of the caisses 
villageoises on savings-deposits, which meet a widespread demand for financial services and which 
make villagers feel that the organization belongs to them. 
The~e organizations are located in one of the poorest regions of Mali, and their deposit and 
loan services are meant for poor people in remote rural areas. Female membership at the caisses 
villageoises iranges from 20 to 50 percent. Average loan size in 1996 was US$ 99, equivalent to 40 
percent of the GDP per capita in Mali. These indicators suggest that these organizations are reaching 
the poor. 
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Membership in the Niger credit unions grew at a rate of more than 100 percent per year, with 
more than 1 O caisses popularies d 'epargne et credit (CPECs) created every year from 1990 to 1994. 
By Decem~r 31, 1996 there were 65 credit unions with 12,340 members, of whom 30 percent were 
women and less than 2 percent were groups. Thus, the average membership per CPEC was 195 
members. About 40 percent of the total number of loans granted went to women. The average loan 
size was US~ 190 in 1996, equivalent to 73 percent of GDP per capita in Niger. While these credit 
unions are reaching a respectable number of people located in poor areas of the country, they are not 
reaching the poorest of the poor. 
Village banking programs aim at reaching the poorest. On average, loan sizes range between 
US$ 50 and US$ 175. These loans are comparable in size with those at the caisses villageoises. 
Because of their gender focus, moreover, village banks reach more women than other programs. The 
average fem~e membership in the West African village banking programs was 90 percent. If gender 
matters for depth of outreach, this weights the outreach of village banks favorably. 
Compared to the individual caisses villageoises and credit unions, a single village bank 
achieves a smaller breadth of outreach. A village bank does not usually exceed 60 members, 
compared to 100 to 400 members per caisse villageoise or credit union. The outreach of a single 
bank in a particular village may be limited if the implementing agency desires to create only one bank 
per village. 
The design of a village bank creates diseconomies to the size of the membership, suggesting 
the desirability of continuing the limits on membership size but eventually allowing more than one to 
operate in a village. Moreover, when several village banks come together in a single structure such 
as becoming members of a credit union, they can achieve significant breadth of outreach. In the 
Freedom From Hunger program in Mali, up to 22 village banks or credit associations, grouping over 
300 members, belonged to a single credit union. This design combined the monitoring advantages 
of low numbers of members per bank with the advantages of a larger network of clients. 
2. Sustainability 
All of the programs reviewed for this case study claim that they achieve repayment rates of 
over 90 percent of outstanding loans. This is a better repayment performance than in many other 
equivalent programs, but it still causes losses from arrears and default. The long-term sustainability 
of these organizations depends on their ability to keep these losses from default at minimum levels 
and to not I only cover operational costs with revenues generated from their financial activities 
(operational self-sufficiency) but to cover both operational and financial expenses with their own 
revenues (financial self-sufficiency). 
Ope~ational self-sufficiency, i.e., the ability of the organization to cover its operational costs 
with its own revenues, was 177 percent at the caisses villageoises for 1995 and 1996. At the Niger 
credit unions, operational self-sufficiency had been steadily improving over the years, to reach 120 
percent in 1996. Operational self-sufficiency was more difficult to achieve in the village banking 
programs, ~here less than 40 percent of organizational costs were being covered with revenues in 
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1996 and 1997.11 Moreover, although in 1996 the Niger credit unions were able to obtain a positive 
net operating margin (financial self-sufficiency), only the caisses villageoises demonstrated that they 
had consistehtly reached this level of sustainability. 
Thus, the caisses villageoises and the credit unions have apparently been able to reach higher 
levels of sustainability than the village banking programs. One reason may be that the latter programs 
are younger (less than five years). Costs should decline with the age of the program because learning 
processes and economies of scale are important (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). The former programs 
may always fare better, however, because they are able to generate substantial revenues from their 
lending operations, keep their costs down by using local resources, and/or operate in less difficult 
market niches compared to village banking programs. 
The caisses villageoises seem to have been able to achieve a better combination of outreach 
and sustainability outcomes than either the credit unions or the village banks. This may be due to the 
fact that the 1 CVECAs are well adapted to the circumstances of the village environment and have 
adopted pricing policies (interest rates) compatible with their sustainability. By using village 
institutions for management of the organization, loan screening, and borrower monitoring, the caisses 
villageoises are able to keep their operating costs down, thereby achieving financial self-sufficiency 
without relying on outside subsidies. This, in turn, creates correct signals to potential clients about 
the organization's expectations with respect to their behavior. 
D. Ownership and Governance 
A feature common to the caisses villageoises, credit unions, and village banks is their client-
owned property rights structure. This feature creates ownership and governance deficiencies, and 
each type of mutualist organization deals with these shortcomings in different ways at different stages 
of their development. 
General assembly meetings at the caisses villageoises are attended by the whole village and 
not by members alone. Members of the caisses villageoises believe that the organization belongs to 
the whole community, and there is an on-going effort to attract the maximum number of villagers to 
the caisse. The performance of the caisse is reviewed in these village assemblies, which also 
determine all loan and savings-deposit policies, including interest rates. These policies can be 
adjusted in each village with everyone's consent. 
JI See Chapters IV, V, and VI for performance indicators for these organizations. These 
indicators are crude approximations, as the validity of the information provided by the 
organizations was not independently verified and as appropriate adjustments, including proper 
ident~fication of operational subsidies and of the opportunity cost of funds, were not made. 
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In Niger and other West African credit unions, general assembly meetings are attended by 
members only and are a forum to discuss the results and performance of the organization as well as 
planning for the future. Meetings are typically well attended. Other incentives provided by tre 
management, such as a lottery during the meeting, may help to boost attendance. 
Village bank members meet often and regularly for loan repayments. At these meetings they 
may conduct other activities such as health and nutrition education (MkNelly, 1997). Only members 
attend the meetings, and any absence or even tardiness are penalized. The meetings are the place to 
discuss any problem, frequently related to loan repayment. Changes in the by-laws cannot usually 
be made without the approval of the implementing agency, i.e., the US-based NGOs. 
Unlfke the caisses villageoises, village banks are handed down a technology that they are not 
allowed to 1alter without the consent of the implementing NGO. Some observers feel that general 
meetings shbuld be a forum to discuss the performance of the organization and to plan for the future 
in light of past activities. If village bank members express the desire to modify the structure of 
interest rates, loan sizes, and contract terms, their requests should be given consideration if the 
program is to be demand-driven and designed to meet the interests of members. Experts on village 
banking believe, however, that standard terms and conditions are needed to keep costs down and to 
facilitate control to prevent fraud. 
Poorly-specified property rights can threaten the sustainability of any organization. At tre 
caisses vil~ageoises, ownership of the organization is widespread and diffused. In general, the 
villagers acknowledge that the caisses villageoises belong to the whole village, and the organizations 
are managed by the villagers without outside intervention. Management committee members are 
elected in a general assembly of all villagers, which also includes non-members. Thus, management 
committee members feel accountable to the whole village. In small, closely-knit settings, this helps 
prevent opportunistic behavior. 
Management committee members are reelected every three years. This gives other villagers 
the opportunity to manage the caisse villageoise, and it provides incentives needed for management 
to perform ivell if they wish to be re-elected. Moreover, the members of the management committee 
earn profit-based remunerations. This type of remuneration creates compatible incentives that 
promote good performance. 
The residual claimant of the assets of the caisses villageoises, however, is the community. 
If a local caisse were to be closed or go bankrupt, the remaining assets would be given to the village 
to be used for community development or would go to another community group designated by the 
villagers. This mobiliz.es support, but responsibilities for control of the organization are still diluted. 
Free-riding! is always a threat in these cases. 
i 
Thus, the experience of the caisses villageoises indicates that elements of design may, up to 
some point, compensate for the weaknesses of the property rights structure of a mutualist 
organization. First, making management committee members accountable to a large constituency 
which monitors their behavior may reduce the threats of opportunistic behavior. Because this 
monitoring is not too costly for villagers who live in close contact, free-riding may not be a major 
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concern. Second, remuneration of committee members only when profits are earned through interest 
earnings ftiom loan repayments also creates incentives that are compatible with the long-term 
sustainability of the organization. Third, a decentralized operation avoids the accumulation of power 
by managers, which creates conflicts of interest in more centralized operations. 
So far, the caisses vil/ageoises have thus been successful in addressing the governance threats 
emerging from this diffused ownership structure. In particular, they have been able to avoid the 
power struggles so common in credit unions, in part by remaining as decentralized units with no 
major overarching superstructure. Indeed, the second-level structure of the caisses villageoises 
model is made up of three regional associations. These associations are only coordinating institutions, 
however, whose primary role is to obtain outside funding on behalf of the caisses. The associations 
do not inteqnediate funds between deficit and surplus caisses and do not interfere with the financial 
policies of each independent Caisse vil/ageoise. 
The Service Commun, at the third level of the caisses villageoises system, is a technical-
assistance unit whose services are paid for by the caisses. It is not a central finance facility. By 
making the Service Commun an independent auditing and technical assistance entity, the caisses 
villageoises have been able to avoid the power struggles that develop when members and technicians 
are joined in the same organization, such as a credit union federations and other second-level apex 
organizations (Ouattara and Gonzalez-Vega, 1998). Much care has been taken in the design of the 
system to avoid these power struggles (Chao-Beroff, 1998) 
The,village's power structure, level of trust, and other informal elements such as the existence 
of indigenous village groups have proven important in combating these governance threats at the 
caisse villageoise level. As these mechanisms may disintegrate with the process of structural 
adjustment, increased social differentiation, and economic growth, the caisses villageoises may have 
to move from an informal to a more formal governance structure. This will not be an easy transition. 
One likely evolutionary path is to rely more on a prudertial regulatory framework to solve ownership 
and governance issues with external assistance. 
The 1P ARMEC law would in principle offer such a framework. This legislation provides the 
system with regulations for prudent management and allows the organizations to have recourse to 
the law to resolve problematic issues. Adoption of the PARMEC framework, however, also carries 
with it one major hurdle, namely an interest rate ceiling on loans. An interest rate that is too low to 
cover operational costs and lower than what is currently practiced at the caisses villageoises would 
reduce intermediation margins and would pose legitimate threats to their ability to mobilize deposits. 
It would also greatly reduce the chances for expanding the network of caisses villageoises, as the 
operational tosts of newer organizations tend to be higher in these early stages and require, thereby, 
higher interest rates. There is still hope that the usury law embedded in the P ARMEC law can be 
revised, as it is tested in the field through implementation by microfinance organizations and as its 
negative implications are more widely recognized. 
Another well-known conflict of interests emerges between borrowers and depositors in 
member-owned organizations. As a result, there is a threat that an organization may become 
borrower-ddminated. When this is the case, borrowers drive the organization with rules that benefit 
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them, such ai:; lower interest rates on loans, even below sustainable levels, and less stringent collateral 
and repayment requirements. This situation can be successfully dealt with and avoided if the 
organization adopts a savings-first approach. 
A savings-based organization, where voluntary deposits are the primary source of loanable 
funds, will have less chance of having borrowers dictate rules that may prove detrimental to the 
sustainabilitY of the organization. When the organization does not link member deposits to their 
loans, members become acutely aware of the true financial intermediation role played by tre 
organization and of the value added generated. This awareness helps prevent that net borrowers 
jeopardize the future of the organization. The voting rule of one person, one vote conspires, 
nevertheles~, against the possibility that strategic depositors could exercise a better degree of 
monitoring bf management and internal control of the organization. The lack of ability to exercise 
sufficient internal control thus discourages important net depositors from placing their funds with the 
organization. 
E. Linkages and Leveraging 
1. Linkages 
Whatever the role, style, and extent of the technical assistance provided to these 
organizations, provisions should usually be made to leave a sustainable central support base when the 
outside spol1;oring agency leaves. Exit of the provider of technical assistance should usually happen 
only after several years. 
For the caisses villageoises, technical assistance was provided by the CIDR for eleven years. 
From 1986 to 1995, the CIDR paid for a resident expatriate advisor as well as for Malian personnel 
hired for the project. The CIDR also covered operating expenses at the project's headquarters 
located in the region. Other costs of technical assistance included start up funds to buy office 
furniture and equipment, including safes, for the caisse villageoises. There were, however, no funds 
for on-lending and no pressures to require that loans be subsidized. 
Traihing of management committee members and cashiers was also provided by the CIDR. 
Regular inspection of the books, the generation of financial statements and of indicators of 
performance, and annual audits of the caisses villageoises were also part of this technical assistance. 
The external assistance ended in 1997, when the CIDR pulled out and left the Service Commun in 
charge of the task. 
The design of the Service Commun should ensure its future success. This comes from the fact 
that this unit charges the caisses villageoises for the services rendered, in order to cover its own 
operating costs. Only profitable caisses contribute, however, to the Service Commun earnings. It 
is believed that this would prevent poorly-performing caisses villageoises from being burdened 
further while it would not allow them to escape the monitoring by the system. This arrangement 
generates, moreover, compatible incentives for the technicians at the Service Commun, as profits 
made by the caisses are critical for the sustainability of their own unit and, thereby, their own jobs. 
The independence of the Service Commun, run exclusively by Malian technicians, allows the unit to 
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offer its sen1ices to other organizations in Mali in addition to the caisses, which further contributes 
to its indepepdence and sustainability. 
For the Niger credit unions, technical assistance was originally provided by WOCCU. This 
assistance lasted seven years, and it included expenses related to two resident foreign advisors, 
operating cqsts for one headquarters office in the capital city, and two offices in remote parts of 
country. The technical advisors and trained managers made regular inspections of the credit unions. 
They also helped with accounting and financial statements as well as with preparation for annual 
meetings. ~y the time WOCCU left the program in June 1997, a second-level support facility was 
being put in place, which would take over the technical assistance function as well as act as a central 
financing facility. While the central financing facility can play a useful role, there are importmt 
dangers frollll mixing the technical assistance and funding functions (Gonzalez-Vega, 1998a). 
All West African village banking programs have a second-level support base provided by the 
implemen~g international NGO. External technical assistance is usually not directly offered, 
however, anp assistance has to be provided by either a local NGO (CRS Benin) or a credit union 
(FFH Mali). jThis two-layered technical assistance mechanism incorporates training in village banking 
methodolog~ and financial management for the local NGO. Funds are also provided to cover the 
operating costs of the local partner and for on-lending to village banks. 
In tum, the implementing NGO is expected to maintain a relationship with a village bank that 
lasts roughly three years, i.e., the time frame required by an individual village bank to go througJ:i 
several loan cycles and presumably become self-sufficient. This frequently does not happen in 
practice. No1 matter when the implementing international sponsor decides to leave, village banking 
practitioners ~ aware that a local support structure should be in place before the external technical 
assistance en<ils. Several village banking programs have chosen diverse institutional options for this 
link: 
(a) A permanent relationship between the village banks and the implementing international 
sponsor, which creates subsidiaries in each country for the sole purpose of implementing 
village banking activities. 
The local subsidiary may attempt to transform itself into a regulated financial institution (e.g., 
FINCA Honduras, World Relief). This is possible when the regulatory framework in the particular 
country offell's a favorable climate for transformed NGOs. This option may have to be considered 
when there a,e no microfinance organizations or commercial banks in the country with which the 
implementing agency can form a partnership. This option may create, however, a dependency on the 
implementing agency, and it fails to solve the graduation issue. 
(b) A per):llanent relationship between the village banks and a commercial bank or a credit union, 
facilitated by the in-country affiliate. 
This scenario exists in Mali with Freedom from Hunger (FFH) and Save the Children 
Foundation (~CF). Clients of village banks are expected to graduate and become clients of the credit 
union. This! option can be quite attractive if viable credit unions or comparable microfinance 
I 
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organization$ exist in the country. When integrated into a viable financial structure, the permanency 
of the village banking organization is promoted from the onset. The graduation problem is handled 
by members of the village bank becoming full members of the credit union and being able to demand 
individual loans. 
( c) A federation of village banks (apex organization) replaces the support functions of the 
implementing agency and accesses commercial sources of funds. 
This scenario is most preferred by CRS, which plans to create apex organizations in Benin and 
Senegal. Thfs option for village banking sustainability raises additional questions, given concern with 
the design of apex organizations. There are serious institutional shortcomings of apex mechanisms 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998a). No apex organization should be considered if there is not a critical 
minimum mass of partner NGOs and/or village banks in the country that justifies its creation. The 
apex organization should be concerned with its own sustainability, and the success of the apex 
organization depends highly on the nature of its assistance. An apex organization that channels donor 
funds free o~ charge to partner NGOs cannot create incentive-compatible credit contracts. Additional 
analysis may be needed to determine the optimal second-tier link for village banks. 
2. Leveraging 
The linkage of the caisses villageoises to the banking sector through the BNDA has been 
valuable. The BNDA has become an additional party in monitoring the performance of the caisses. 
In tum, being able to leverage their own lending capacity with outside funds has allowed the caisses 
villageoises to stretch their deposit base and sustain their growth. Leveraging the funding structure 
with commercial funds is thus a valuable organizational feature as well as a sign of soundness of the 
caisses. Thi~ is so because the financial viability of the organization must be demonstrated before it 
becomes eligible for the bank's loans. 
I 
The k to the banking sector sought by the caisses villageoises is different from the credit 
unions' goal of transforming their central financing facility into a banking unit, thereby competirg 
with the comJmercial banks. The caisses villageoises are a complement to the formal banking system 
and attract outside funds to the rural areas to be added to their deposit base. At best, the central 
financing facility intermediates a given volume of funds among CUs. At worst, it taxes individual 
credit unions to provide a liquidity management service. This is a useful but expensive service, and 
overall it does not attract additional funds for the local clienteles. 
Som~ village banking programs have been able to take advantage of the leveraging power of 
partner organizations as in the case of FFH and the Kafo Jiginew in Mali. As with the caisses 
villageoises,
1 
the Kafo Jiginew network has been able to attract commercial funds from the BNDA 
to onlend to !its member organizations. A major flaw of the original village banking model was the 
creation of transitory, not permanent, links of the stand-alone village banks and the financial system. 
This creates a self-defeating structure of incentives. One possible solution to the permanency problem 
is to make village banks part of another viable microfinance organization, such as a credit union or 
even a caisse villageoise. 
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The institutional lessons learned from the caisses villageoises tell us that creating a permanent 
physical structure from the onset is important. This infrastructure from the beginning that a caisse 
villageois~ is a serious financial organization, while a village bank looks more like an informal 
ROSCA. this village bank lacks a physical structure, and its management have undefined powers 
and authority. Stand-alone village banks may regard the implementing agency as the ultimate owner 
of the village bank and as the power that dictates all rules and regulations. A framework for ensuring 
institutioruil incentives for sustainability and accountability at all of the organizational levels in a 
village banking program would require that the village banks develop either the links to other 
intermediarjes or a physical and institutional structure to more effectively signal and guarantee their 
I permanence. 
Anbther lesson learned from all of the programs included in the case study is that direct 
hands-on t~chnical assistance is important, particularly in the early years of the program, and that 
the sponsoring agency should plan to provide comprehensive and fairly long-term assistance. Before 
this technical assistance ends, a support base should be left in place. This support facility should be 
able to brhtg member organizations to a desirable level of sustainability. 
Currently, two alternative designs for a central support facility exist in these micro finance 
networks in Francophone West Africa. In one case, a central support facility engages in purely 
financial adtivities. It must have a comparative advantage for this task. This is the case of the central 
financing facility of a credit union network, which intermediates funds among member credit unions 
and from <;mtside donors. In the other case, a central support unit engages exclusively in market-
driven, us~r-charge technical assistance services, such as the Service Commun of the caisses 
villageoises system. In this case, member organizations turn to the commercial banking sector or 
other marJ!cets for funds. These specialized mechanisms seem to be more successful than apex 
organizati~ns that combine both financial and technical assistance functions. Both types of 
specialized central facilities may offer valuable services. It seems important, nevertheless, to keep 
channels for funds and the provision of technical assistance as separate as possible. 
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IV 
THE CAISSES VILLAGEOISES IN MALI 
The caisses villageoises as a model of micro finance were developed in the mid- l 980s by the 
Centre International de Developpement et de Recherche (CIDR), a French NGO located in 
I 
Autreches, putside Paris. This methodology is thus almost as old as the FINCA village banking 
model. The 1caisses villageoises were first started in Burkina Faso. They can be found today in 
several other West African countries including Mali, the Gambia, Niger, Madagascar, Ethiopia, and 
Sao Tome d Principe (Chao-Beroff, 1997). The Mali program has achieved the highest level of 
maturity thus far, and it is the focus of this case study.12 
A. Evolution and Organizational Design 
The 'system of caisses villageoises d'epargne et de credit autogeree (CVECAs) was 
established hl 1986 in the Dogon region of Mali by the CIDR, with the financial support of the KfW, 
the German development bank. There were 52 caisses villageoises in existence in the Dogon region 
by the end of 1997. At that time, these organizations offered financial services to 21,950 members. 
After eleven years of existence, the program achieved its latest institutional step in July of 1997, when 
the CIDR left the system entirely in the hands of the villagers and of a Malian technical staff. 
The ~VECAs system consists of three levels of operations and management: 
(a) the caisses villageoises, 
(b) the r~gional associations of CVECAs, and 
( c) the Service Commun. 
I 
Linkages $ong these three levels of the system's organizational structure and the terms of the 
financial transactions at each level are depicted in Figure 1. The interest rate structure that 
accompanies the flows of funds across this organizational set up is discussed below. Each level has 
well-defined functions, examined next. 
1. ' The caisse villageoise 
At th~ first level of the organizational structure are the local caisses villageoises. According 
to the CIDR, the caisse villageoise is "more than merely a bank based in a village." It is a 
microfinance! organization that belongs to the villagers, and it is structured in such a way that it 
fosters commbnity development Thus, profits from the intermediation between savings-deposits and 
loans are invested in community development projects such as school construction, well pumps, and 
the like. 
12 For a detailed evaluation of the caisses villageoises system, see Gonzalez-Vega, Nguyen and 
Ouattara (1998) and Ouattara, Nguyen, Gonzalez-Vega, and Graham (1997). 
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Figure 1. Organizational Design at the Caisses Villageoises Model 
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Th s allocation of profits to village-wide projects (residual claims) and active village-wide 
participati n in the governance of the caisse villageoise are important elements in the structure of 
incentives for decision-making. These incentives are critical because the caisses villageoises are 
highly ind pendent organizations without well-defined owners. They are designed to operate in a 
highly d :tralized system, in which all but a small portion of the activities required to manage the 
CVECAs provided by the villagers themselves. For this participation to be successful, the right 
structure of incentives is needed. 
I 
Th~ creation of a caisse villageoise begins with a feasibility study conducted by the CIDR 
about the vtnage's economic potential, literacy level, history and social cohesion, as well as a potential 
membership siz.e of more than 400 adults. 13 This effort to determine the feasibility of a caisse in the 
particular ~illage also determines the depth of outreach of the system. Inevitably, poorer and more 
remote vill~ges are not eligible for a caisse. 
If t)ie results of the feasibility study are positive, a general assembly of all villagers is called 
to discuss fn.atters related to: 
13 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
This description refers to the first eleven years of operation of the Mali system. After July 
1997, the functions formerly performed by the CIDR were completely absorbed by tre 
Se-A,vice Commun. 
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(a) the ¢onstruction of a building to house the caisse. The village provides construction materials 
and1labor while the CIDR provides the safe, a metal door, and office equipment. Village 
inp4ts contribute to strengthening the sense of village ownership of the organization; 
(b) sele¢tion of a Management Committee made up of villagers, men and women, chosen by their 
peel's. Two cashiers and a comptroller are also chosen to work for the caisse villageoise. 
All elected officers are then trained by the CIDR before the opening of the caisse; and 
! 
( c) adoption of internal rules and regulations including levels of interest rates and membership 
fees1 Fees are kept low (equivalent to US$ 1 to US$ 3) to allow everyone to become a 
me~ber. Active village participation in the governance of the caisse supports monitoring 
effottts that constrain opportunistic behavior by caisse officers and that contribute to contract 
enforcement. 
2. The regional association 
A rtjgional association represents the second level in the organizational structure of the 
system. It is, a union of all caisses villageoises from a particular region. It serves as an umbrella and 
as a coordinating institution. One of its primary roles is to obtain external funding for the member 
CVECAs. there are three associations in as many regions where the caisses villageoises are located 
in Mali. Th' association's staff is made up of selected management committee members from the 
individual caisses villageoises. 
3. The Service Commun 
The Service Commun represents the third level of the organizational structure. It is a central 
unit whose role is to provide financial and technical support services to the associations and to the 
caisses villageoises. It replaced the expatriate CIDR advisors after the last resident advisor left in 
1995, and it is made up of a small Malian staff of four people. The Service Commun is entirely 
funded thro4gh billing the caisses villageoises for its services. It receives 15 percent of the profits 
of each caisse villageoise to finance its operations. This fee is charged only when the CVECA earns 
positive profits. This fee structure creates compatible incentives for both the caisse and the Service 
Commun to work towards enhancing the profitability and sustainability of the organization. 
B. Policies 
The policies adopted by the caisses villageoises have promoted the sustainability of these 
:village organizations without jeopardizing the depth of their outreach. This is not surprising. These 
policies ha~e reflected the value that the villagers place on the permanency of their financial 
institution. these policies have thus reflected the opportunity cost of funds in this setting and have 
responded toithe genuine demands of the villagers for specific financial services. These policies are 
described neKt. 
1. Deposit services 
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The caisses villageoises have adopted the savings-first approach recommended by the CIDR. 
They receiv@ no endowment ofloanable funds to start their lending operations. During the first year 
of operation, they have to exclusively rely on deposits for their loan-granting activities. 
Table 2. O~erational Characteristics of theCais'ses Villac..eois'es in Mali, 1993-1996. 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Membership size 12,515 15,330 18,819 21,495 
Members ftom other villages (%) 19.0 25.0 28.0 34.0 
Membership annual growth (%) 22.5 22.8 14.2 
Total depositsa 78,291,723 122,331,995 186,463, 158 243,798,733 
Deposit growth in real terms (%) 56.3 52.4 30.7 
Average tetm deposit size 22,100 38,055 49,648 62,500 
Number o~ individual depositors 1,752 2,453 2,823 2,794 
Total loan amount granteda 128,198,529 179,961,637 284,889,474 459,374,138 
Loan disbursements growth in real 
terms(%) 40.4 58.3 61.2 
BNDA fundsa 23,064,076 47,934,783 75,026,316 162,561,576 
Average amount granted per 
borrower 14,600 21,613 33,567 49,405 
Number of loans granted 8,354 9,767 11,288 13,213 
Number of borrowers 5,506 6,438 7,334 8,383 
Source: Unpublished records of the CIDR project in Mali. The figures were not verified by 
the researchers. A few inconsistencies among the data could not be removed. 
Note: a: Amounts in CF AF at constant 1990 prices. 
Moreover, there are no forced savings at the caisses vil/ageoises and loans are not linked to 
deposits. The average deposit balance was CFAF 62,500 (US$ 125) in 1996, and deposit growth was 
31 percent in real terms in the same year (Table 2). Although the average size of a deposit is higher 
than averag~ loan size, the small size of these transactions reflects the poverty of the clientele. A low-
cost technology to handle these small transactions is required for sustainability of the organization. 
The caisses villageoises offer several deposit products such as: 
(a) demand deposit accounts, which earn no interest, and 
(b) terrh deposit accounts (3-12 months), which pay 18-30 percent annual interest rates. 
Term deposit accounts are by far the preferred savings instrument. They attract more than 
two-thirds ~f the total volume of deposits collected (Ouattara et al., 1997). This is probably due in 
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part to the fact that most economic activities as well as consumption patterns are seasonal in the 
Dogon region. Most clients of the caisses villageoises are farmers engaged in agricultural production 
with highly seasonal income flows. Earnings occur several months after planting. In this 
environment, term deposits offer a rewarding alternative means of storing purchasing power for 
future use. As in most poor communities, the management of liquid reserves is a major household 
activity. 
2. Loan services 
There is no targeting by loan use or by gender at the caisses villageoises. Loans are granted 
to both men and women who are creditworthy, and no conditions are levied on the use of the funds. 
Loans are granted only to individuals, and they always require collatera, though non-traditional forms 
of collateral are used, such as animals, tools and farm implements, as well as jewelry from women. 
In general, close to 40 percent of the members receive loans in a given year and have a loan 
outstanding at any given time. In 1996, thecaisses villageoises granted loans to 8,383 members, for 
an average of CF AF 49 ,405 (US$ 99) per borrower. In real terms, the rate of growth of the loans 
disbursed was 61 percent from 1995 to 1996 (Table 2). This rapid growth of the loan portfolio was 
not discouraged by the high interest rates charged, thus reflecting a strong demand for credit at the 
village level. 
Annual interest rates on loans range from 36 to 60 percent, depending on the caisse. These 
comparatively high rates are chosen by the villagers based mainly on the informal interest rates with 
which they are familiar. These rates allow the caisse villageoise to maintain a sufficient margin (at 
least 20 percentage points) between the deposit and the lending rates. Interest rates at informal 
village groups averaged 110 percent per annum (Ouattara et al., 1997). 
The average term to maturity of a loan is six months. In 1995, the majority of loans (78 
percent) were used in trading activities, 16 percent were used for agriculture and livestock rearing, 
3 percent for social purposes, 2 percent for artisanal work, and 1 percent for seasonal migration. 
Agricultural loans were generally for longer terms and were issued at lower interest rates than loans 
to traders. 
3. Contract terms and conditions 
The caisses villageoises pay interest rates on deposits that are positive in real terms.14 
Attractive remuneration of deposits creates a pool of net depositors, essential for true financial 
intermediation and for sufficient monitoring of management. In fact, the caisses villageoises were 
able to attract large depositors, with CFAF 137,678 (US$ 275) as the average of these larger size 
deposits. These deposits came mostly from informal village groups and from big traders. 
14 The caisses villageoises operate in a low inflation environment. Between 1990 and 1996, the 
average inflation rate in Mali was 5.8 percent per year. 
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A member is not required to make a deposit in order to receive a loan. The caisses 
villageoisef attract deposits by offering attractive interest rates and ensuring the quality of service 
(i.e., safe and confidential accounts). The policy at the caisses villageoises is to match the term 
structures of assets and of liabilities at the organization's level by trying to collect longer-tenn 
deposits (3 to 12 months) and disbursing shorter-term loans (1to9 months). This policy lowers the 
costs of liqmdity management. 
Int¢rest rates vary depending on the intermediation and operating costs at the particular 
CVECA mid on the costs of borrowing from external sources. All caisses villageoises keep a gross 
intermediation margin of at least 20 percentage points, thereby charging interest rates on loans of 36 
to 60 perce111-t per year. This margin, relatively wide compared to those of commercial banks, allows 
the caisses villageoises to cover their costs, including the payment of external auditing services, and 
still be profitable. Profitability is necessary to keep the right structure of incentives when there is 
village-wiqe governance. 
I 
Loans are primarily funded from member deposits and, more recently, from external 
borrowing from the Agricultural Development Bank of Mali (BNDA). These organizations had to 
turn to outside funding to address increases in loan demand compared to deposit growth. Loan 
disbursements increased 61 percent from 1995 to 1996, while deposits grew 31 percent over the same 
period, su~esting excess demand for credit at the village level (Table 2). 
I 
I 
Despite the increased reliance on BNDA funds, whose importance grew from 18 percent to 
3 5 percent of the loan portfolio, the caisses villageoises still rely heavily on deposits as the main 
source of ~ds for their loans. Given the rules for access to BNDA funds, these proportions should 
not change further. This matters, given the importance of depositors in balancing interests within the 
organization and preventing borrower domination. With the availability of funds from the BNDA, 
the caisses ~illageoises have also engaged in better term transformation, by granting relatively longer 
loans of six months or more, which are not possible otherwise, given the term structure of deposits. 
C. Ou~reach 
1. Breadth of outreach 
By 1December 31, 1996, there were 21,950 members in 52 CVECAs in the Dogon region of 
Mali. This represents an average membership of 422 people per local organization. The caisses 
villageoises can reach as high as 95 percent of the adult population of a village. The reasons for this 
I 
outstanding local outreach include the community-oriented focus of the CVECAs, which allows all 
villagers to ;participate in the organization and in its governance. Management committee members 
are continupusly working on bringing in more members to the organization. The resulting diffused 
governance structure may conspire in the future, however, against their growth. 
Anpther reason for the outstanding outreach is the focus of the CVECAs on savings services, 
which medt a widespread demand for financial services and which make the villagers feel that the 
caisse villageoise belongs to them. The incorporation of diligent depositors is an indicator of a 
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valuable dimension of outreach and a more robust source of institutional strength than village-wide 
participatidn in the organization. 
Table 3. Financial Indicators and Operational Efficiency at theCaiS'ses VillageoiS'es in 
Mali, 1995-96. 
1995 1996 
Financial expenses (CFAF) 29,981,265 51,095,800 
Operating expenses (CF AFt 5,234,010 5,680,310 
Total expenses (CF AF) 35,215,275 56,776,110 
Total income (CFAF)b 60,199,275 103, 706,485 
Net earnings (CF AF)c 24,984,000 46,930,375 
Average total assets (CF AF)d 286,491, 700 518,433,890 
Average total equity (CF AF)d 34,188,705 58,397,920 
Average tdtal liabilities (CF AFt 252,302,995 460,035,970 
Average outstanding portfolio (CF AF)d 294,999,000 320,251,065 
Operating expenses/Outstanding portfolio (%) 1.8 1.8 
Operational self-sufficiencye (%) 170.9 182.7 
Gross financial marginr (%) 10.5 10.1 
Net operating marging (%) 8.7 9.1 
Source: Caisses Villageoises and Service Commun records. 
Notes: a: Operating expenses are equal to personnel expenses and administrative expenses, 
including depreciation of fixed assets. They do not include financial costs and loan 
loss provisions. 
b: 
c: 
d: 
e: 
f' 
g: 
Income from interest and loan fees. 
Total income minus total expenses. 
Averages ofbeginning-of-year and end-of-year balances outstanding, to compensate 
for the rapid growth of the amounts outstanding. Income earned (a flow) must be 
compared to the average stock. 
Operational self-sufficiency = Financial income /Financial costs + Operating costs + 
Loan loss provision. 
Gross financial margin= (Financial income - Financial costs) I Average total assets. 
Net operating margin = Gross financial margin - Operating costs I Average total 
assets. 
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2. Depth of outreach 
! 
The caisses villageoises are located in one of the poorest regions of Mali. Thus, their services 
and especially their loans are meant for poor people in remote rural areas. Despite the absence of 
gender targeting, female membership at the caisses vi/lageoises ranges from 20 to 50 percent, 
depending on the village. The average loan size of US$ 99 is small, representing 40 percent of the 
country's per capita GNP. The caisses are able, therefore, to attain their goal of reaching poor 
people in Mali. The relative wealth of their members is further explored in Ouattara et al. (1997). 
D. Sustainability 
Sustainability of a microfinance organization matters (Gonzalez-Vega, 1998c ). One condition 
for sustainability is financial self-sufficiency. The CVECAs have shown a high degree of self. 
sufficiency. 
1. Self-sufficiency 
The most basic indicator of operational efficiency examines the organization's operating 
expenses as a percentage of its average loan portfolio.15 This proportion reveals how much it costs 
the organiza~on to lend one CF AF. High ratios may suggest administrative inefficiency, a small loan 
portfolio or a combination of both. The caisses villageoises show low ratios, with operating costs 
as low as 1.8 percent of the loan portfolio in 1995 and 1996 (Table 3). Operational expenses at the 
caisses villageoises are, thus, very low. This is a sign of an efficient operation and it reflects the 
adaptation qf the organization to village conditions. Profits are generated, in tum, to cover profit-
sharing arrangements with the management committee and to pay for the assistance from the Service 
Commun. 
i 
Opetational self-sufficiency indicators at the caisses villageoises also show that these 
organizations more than adequately cover their operational costs with their overall revenues. The 
proportion was above 100 percent in 1995 and 1996. In 1996, for every CF AF 1 of operating 
expenses, the caisses villageoises generated CF AF 1.8 in income. 
The performance and sustainability of a microfinance organization depends on its financial 
self-sufficie11:cy, i.e., on its ability to generate sufficient income to cover not only its operating but 
also its finarlcial expenses. In 1995 and 1996, the net operating margin of the caisses villageoises 
was positive and it reached 9.1 percent in 1996 (Table 3). A positive net operating margin indicates 
that the caisses villageoises were covering all costs with income derived from their loan operations. 
They were f4iancially self-sufficient. This margin was not influenced by the presence of donor funds, 
because the daisses villageoises did not receive any grants of funds for their on-lending operations. 
They were, therefore, mostly independent from subsidies. 
15 Given limited resources, a full financial evaluation of the system was not undertaken. These 
self-reported figures are presented here for illustrative purposes (orders of magnitude) only. 
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2. Repayment performance 
Rep~yment performance at the caisses villageoises had so far been outstanding. Repayment 
had been maintained at a high 97 percent of amounts due over the years. These high repayment rates 
may reflect the creation of a permanent relationship of the clients with the organization, in an 
environment where there are not many other options to gain access to financial services. Lack of 
alternatives creates incentives to protect this relationship. The villagers believe that the caisses 
villageoises belong to them and make every effort to protect their integrity as a valuable village 
institution. 
The caisses villageoises have also adopted a path to sustainability through the creation of 
associations supported by a Service Commun, which took over the support function of the 
implementiJllg agency (CIDR). These associations play an important screening and monitoring role 
in the process of obtaining access to commercial sources of funding for the individual caisses. 
Threats to organizational viability may come, however, from increasing dependence on these 
outside funds. Fortunately, the caisses villageoises have been able to restrict outside funding from 
the BNDA' to less than 50 percent of their loan portfolio. Hence, reliance on deposits remains 
important {or the caisses. 
Nevertheless, a local savings threshold may be reached quickly in village economies facing 
binding wealth constraints, and management needs to come up with ingenuous ways of generating 
more deposits. This requires convincing villagers, who still keep most of their savings in physical 
form, especially livestock, to deposit more savings with the caisses. For this, they need to persuade 
villagers of the safety and liquidity of the deposits. 
E. Ownership and Governance 
1. Ownership 
As with other member-owned organizations, the caisses villageoises are characterized by the 
fact that there are a lot of diffused owners rather than a major owner with a vested equity capital or 
strong stake. Moreover, voting powers do not depend on the equity at risk. This rule destroys 
incentives for the right degree of internal control. Moreover, the crucial element in ownership is the 
ultimate power to dispose of residual claims. In the case of the caisses villageoises, the village is an 
undefined owner and the rules for allocating residual claims make the village at large the ultimate final 
beneficiary of the performance of the organization. 
whlle participatory institutions tend to have deep roots, the dual role of owner and client may 
pose potehtial conflicts of interest that could threaten the sustainability of the organization. Such 
conflicts have not yet emerged at the caisses villageoises, in part because the ownership of the 
organization extends to the entire village (members and non-members) and village social structures 
are still strong. Decision-makers are all the villagers. This feature diminishes the power of members 
who may want to obtain private benefits at the expense of other members. The village has a vested 
interest in' protecting the organization due to the absence of other financial alternatives. Thus, the 
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villagers provide effective monitoring of the caisses villageoises, which has prevented opportunistic 
behavior and ensured good repayment. The fact that these villages in the Pays Dogan region in Mali 
are relative small (400 to 500 adult populations) clearly facilitates effective governance. 
In case any of the caisses villageoises were to go bankrupt, the assets would belong to the 
village. The villagers would decide on the reallocation of those assets. The alternatives include a 
community development project or a transfer of the assets to another village organization. If the 
caisse owes the BNDA any funds, it would have to repay this debt before any reallocation of tre 
remaining assets within the village takes place. 
2. Governance 
I 
The: caisses villageoises system has a fairly flat and simple organizational and governance 
structure. All villagers elect a management committee to run the organization. The management 
committee is made up of men and women who are natural leaders. Its members are elected by the 
entire villag~ for three years, with the appointment being renewable just once, for a maximum term 
of six yearsl This rule attempts to avoid any abuse and opportunistic behavior. The committee is 
responsible for making loan decisions. Its members receive a remuneration at the end of the year 
from the profits generated through the interest earnings on loan activity. This incentive compatible 
arrangement ensures that management evaluates loans carefully. 
This use of performance-based incentives for management makes more sense when it is 
coupled with management's discretionary powers over important decisions such as screening loan 
applicants, ~eciding whether to grant the loan and for what amount, and pursuing contract 
enforcement Proper incentives given to management through profit sharing are a key ingredient of 
the good performance of the caisses villageoises as well as in removing incentives for shirking and 
collusion. 
Intetnal rules and regulations are reviewed yearly in a general assembly of all villagers, 
members and non-members. At that time, all decisions with respect to the future of the caisse are 
made, including changes in the level and term structure of interest rates as well as membership fees. 
Based on the assumption that effective governance is critical for organizational performance 
and sustainability, it is critical to examine the extent to which authority and responsibility have been 
decentralized. This is accomplished next. 
3. Decentralization 
At the first-tier, the caisses villageoises are highly decentralized, independently run by 
managers chosen among the villagers. Governance involves the entire village during annual meetings. 
The villagers make all decisions on pricing deposit and loan products, profit allocation, and the 
election of new committee members. This approach leads to a high degree of local accountability for 
governance of the caisse and for sound lending decisions, as long as village structures are effective. 
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Loan decisions at the caisses villageoises are as decentralized as possible for reasons of 
efficiency. These decisions are entirely left to the loan committee in each village. Strong local 
involvement: in selecting borrowers and in handling repayment is essential for sound credit operations, 
given the challenges of evaluating creditworthiness. Outsiders would have to incur high costs to 
overcome the inevitable information barriers. 
At the second-tier level, client participation remains strong. Independent local caisses 
villageoises elect representatives to the associations. The associations are responsible for reviewing 
loan applications for outside funding for the member caisses. The danger of insider behavior is 
constrained by strict eligibility criteria for loans. 
Thus, two critical elements in effective governance exist at the caisses villageoises. First, 
authority and responsibility have been decentralized from the beginning. Second, compatible 
incentives make management decisions contribute to the sustainability of the organization by making 
sustainability valuable to the decision-makers. 
F. Challenges 
Several elements behind the success of the caisses villageoises also represent the biggest 
challenges for the sustainability of these organizations in the future. These circumstances include: 
1. Cost-effective savings-deposit mobilization 
There is a limit to the amount of savings the caisses villageoises can mobilize within their 
relatively small villages, and this threshold may be quickly reached in poorer environments. Longer-
term and hrrger volumes of savings are almost impossible to collect in this environment but are 
nevertheless needed to meet the demand for longer-term and larger loans. As discussed below, the 
caisses villageoises have to tum to outside funds to meet such demands and, at this point, outside 
funds repr~sent 30 percent of the loan portfolio of the system. 
Additional deposits may be increasingly costly to mobilize. This may be the case as tre 
organization tries to mobilize deposits from members living in other villages. If the cost-effective 
frontier of going to other villages to bring in new members and depositors outweighs the benefits, it 
might be p~ferable for the caisses villageoises to stay within the boundaries of their own village and 
to devise other ways of increasing local deposits. 
Cop.vincing villagers to deposit more with the caisse villageoise requires that members 
perceive benefits from doing so. One such benefit is the positive real interest rate paid on deposits. 
Another in¢entive is the opportunity for safe-keeping of funds based on the perception that the caisse 
villageoise is a secure place, as signaled by the physical appearance of the office. In general, these 
offices ar~ built to last, using durable materials such as bricks and tin roofs. Continuous 
improvements are being made, such as adding reinforced doors, to make them as theft proof as 
possible. 
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2. Sustained loan recovery and low costs 
Village monitoring and trust protect small one-village organizations and allow them to 
maintain repayment rates of 97 percent of amounts due. This repayment performance is nearly 
impossible to achieve when the local organization expands to other villages or operates in a larger 
urban environment. Thus, the added screening and monitoring costs in lending to outside borrowers 
may outwqigh the benefits of bringing such members into the organization. So far, the caisses 
villageoise~ have tried to reduce the risk of default from outside members by imposing more 
restrictions' on them. Thus, an outside borrower needs a guarantor who is a resident of the village 
and a member of the local caisse, in addition to the usual physical collateral. In effect, management 
is keeping its monitoring role within the village boundaries by transferring this function to someone 
from the village. 
I 
Giv~n the use of village mechanisms for borrower monitoring and contract enforcement, 
operating dosts have been low, as shown in Table 4. These costs have not increased with the 
outstandin~ portfolio and are quite low compared to those incurred by other microfinance 
organizatiops. 
Table 4. Consolidated Income Statement for theCais'ses Villageois'es in Mali, 1995-96. 
INCOME 
i 
Loan Inte~est income 
I 
Interest re~eivable 
I 
TOTAL l]NCOME 
EXPENSES 
Interest paid on deposit accounts 
Interest payable 
Administrative expenses 
Depreciatipn expenses 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
NET INCOME 
Source: 
Note: 
Caisses villageoises and Service Commun reports. 
Amounts in CF AF. 
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12-31-95 12-31-96 
39,540,750 
20,658,525 
60.199.275 
17,120,315 
12,860,950 
4,143,000 
1,091,010 
35.215.275 
24,984,000 
60,699,005 
43,007,480 
103.706.485 
26,535,530 
24,560,270 
5,336,610 
343,700 
56.776.110 
46,930,375 
3. Effective management of outside funds 
The injection of outside funds has not yet turned out to be the threat that might have been 
anticipated. Access to a moderate amount of external funds has, instead, allowed the caisses 
villageoises to grant larger and longer-term loans to their members, which would have been beyond 
the capacit}' of the funding base of local deposits. To achieve this performance, the caisses 
villageoises have had to consider and answer several questions such as: 
(a) When is outside money just too much? 
Ideally, outside money should be kept at a level such that it does not discourage deposit 
mobilizationl The caisses vil/ageoises have put a system of requirements in place to prevent this from 
happening. The main constraint is tying the availability ofBNDA funds to 150 percent of deposits 
by the caisse villageoise during the first two years and to 200 percent thereafter. Moreover, to be 
eligible for a loan, an individual caisse villageoise must meet the following criteria: 
(i) it has been in operation for at least a year, 
(ii) it has high quality management, and 
(iii) it has a loan default rate of less than 15 percent. 
Two elements of these criteria deserve comment. First, the linkage of outside funds to the 
level of local deposits is an important and positive feature that protects the incentives for local deposit 
mobilizatiop.. The criteria of allowing access to outside money to reach 1.5 to 2 times the local 
deposit baseldoes seem high, however. While this is a ceiling, and not all caisses villageoises reach 
this level, there has been a recent tendency for a rapid growth in this outside money. The evidence 
in Table 5 underscores the growth of BNDA debt in the total liabilities of the caisses villageoises, 
registering a greater share of total liabilities than locally mobilized deposits for 1996. 
The second element is the relaxed criterion for arrears (i.e., 15 percent) for qualification to 
access outsi4e money through the associations. Again, this is a floor, to guarantee at least 85 percent 
loan recovery. In actual fact, very few caisses villageoises register loan recovery rates below 95 
percent, and most are above 97 percent, except for some recently established caisses just learning to 
operate for the first time. Thus, the 15 percent criterion is largely unimportant and non-operative. 
Still, it would be more sound to establish a more rigorous eligibility criterion, more in line with the 
actual perfomnance of the caisses themselves. This is particularly important when a rapidly growing 
portfolio masks the relative importance of arrears. 
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Table 5. Consolidated Balance Sheet Data for theCaiS'ses VillageoiS'es in Mali, 1995-96. 
ASSETS 
Cash 
Interest receivable 
Loan portfolio 
Due from banks (deposits) 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
BNDAde~t 
Guarantee fund 
Credit fund 
I 
Term deposit accounts 
Passbook accounts 
Interest parable 
Total Liabilities 
Equity 
Previous year income (loss) 
Year-end Net Income 
Source: 
Note: 
Total Equity 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
Caisses villageoises and Service Commun reports. 
Amounts in CF AF. 
12-31-95 12-31-96 
33,441,335 35,585,220 
20,658,525 43,007,480 
222, 118,840 418,383,290 
10,273,000 21,457,900 
286.491.700 518.433.890 
99,785,000 232,108,000 
3,013,415 4,883,295 
13,362,100 24,972,545 
113,283,885 158,512,180 
9,997,645 14,999,680 
12,860,950 24,560,270 
252,302,995 460,035,970 
9,795,235 12,483,960 
-590,530 -1,016,415 
24,984,000 46,930,375 
34,188,705 58,397,920 
286.491.700 518.433.890 
Self-reported, unverified figures. 
(b) What incentives will the caisses villageoises have to mobilize deposits aggressively? 
As pointed out above, the outside loan criteria generally encourage each caisse villageoise 
to pursue arl aggressive deposit mobilization policy and to keep a good flow of deposits at the local 
level. The~e criteria also ensure repayment to the outside creditor as only creditworthy, gocxl 
performing taisses villageoises are eligible for outside funding. Meeting the revealed preference of 
members ($nsforming latent into effective demand) with new products such as bigger and longer-
term loans and repeat loans, as made possible by the outside funds, induces voluntary contract 
compliance~ which translates into high loan repayment rates of 97 percent of the amounts due. 
There has been no negative growth in the amount of deposits mobilized. In fact, deposits 
have grown; faster than the membership. Thus, while the membership grew 22 percent in 1994 and 
1995 and 14 percent in 1996, in real terms deposits grew 56 percent in 1994, 52 percent in 1995, and 
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31 percent in 1996 (Table 3). Deposits have been increasing at a decreasing rate, however, probably 
because some village threshold may have been reached. Growth remains brisk, nevertheless, which 
is encourag~ng for the future of these organizations. 
4. The PARMEC law challenge 
The,PARMEC law is one of the biggest challenges the caisses villageoises have to face. The 
worst threat comes from the interest rate cap on loans. Other requirements under the law, such as 
reporting, data collection, and reserve requirements are already being followed by the caisses with 
the help of the Service Commun and will not be a hindrance on the performance of these 
organizations. Although Mali approved the P ARMEC law in August 1994, the law has not been 
vigorously enforced. The hope is that intense domestic and international debate on its likely negative 
consequences may trigger welcome changes in the near future. 
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v 
THE NIGER CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 
A. Introduction 
Credit unions (CUs) are thought to have originated in Germany, with the advent of the 
Raiffeissen societies in the Nineteenth Century. Friedrich W. Raiffeissen created the cooperative 
credit institµtions to help the poor and the needy and as charitable organizations. As they became 
more self-help oriented, the credit societies grew rapidly throughout Europe, to give rise to the credit 
union movement as it is known today throughout the world. 
The lworld Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) is the worldwide organization ofCUs and 
similar cooperative financial institutions. Members of WOCCU include seven regional and national 
credit union! confederations serving Africa, Asia, Australia, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, 
and the Unifud States. There are four free-standing leagues representing Fiji, Great Britain, Ireland, 
and New Zealand. 
i 
I 
By December 1996, there were 36,244 CUs in the world, with a membership of more than 
89 million people, and a penetration rate of 6.65 percent of the population (WOCCU statistical 
report). 16 qeposits were estimated at US$ 331 billion, loans at US$ 253.6 billion, reserves at US$ 
36.1 billion~ and assets at US$ 379.3 billion. 
The iA:frican Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA) is 
a WOCCU member. It gathers CUs from 28 countries. Its headquarters are in Nairobi, Kenya 
ACCOSCA is comprised of 4,478 organizations, with 2.5 million members, US$ 481.9 million in 
deposits, U$$ 396.1 million in loans, US$ 18.8 million in reserves, and US$ 523.1 million in assets. 
The penetration rate was 1.75 percent for African CUs, considerably lower than in other parts of the 
world. 
In Africa, CUs have been primarily sponsored by organizations such as WOCCU, 
Developpement International desJardins (DID) from Canada, and Credit Mutuel of France. The 
sections below review the Niger credit union movement as an example of how WOCCU has applied 
its latest technology and innovations in an African environment. 
B. Gerleral Background 
The: credit union movement in Niger was started by WOCCU as a pilot project in 1990 in 
response td recommendations by a research team from The Ohio State University (Graham and 
Cuevas, 1990). The study by the OSU team in 1986-87 md found that there were no formal financial 
16 The population penetration rate is measured with respect to the working-age population of 
wdccu member countries. 
49 
institutions outside of the main urban areas of Niger (Graham et al., 1987). Instead, rural households 
had to rely almost exclusively on sources to satisfy their demand for financial services. 
I 
The. project for the development of CUs or caisses populaires d' epargne et de credit 
(CPECs), as' they are called in Niger, started in the department of Zinder in 1990. The first three-and-
a-half years of the pilot phase were devoted to developing and promoting CUs in Zinder, where 11 
CPECs were created during that period. During the second and last phase (1992-1997), the objective 
of the project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was to 
promote and extend CPEC development in other departments. 
As of April 30, 1997 there were 65 CPECs in six out of eight departments in Niger (Zinder, 
Maradi, Niamey, Kollo, Tillabery, and Dosso). These CPECs had 12,700 members, of whom 35 
percent were women. The movement had accumulated CF AF 450 million (US$ 900,000) in assets, 
CF AF 400 million (US$ 800,000) in deposits, and CF AF 190 million (US$ 380,000) in loans 
outstanding. 17 
At the end of the project in June 1997, WOCCU handed over the CPECs to the national 
association,'Mouvement des Caisses Populaires d'Epargne et de Credit (MCPEC), whose primary 
mission is to create a fully functional central financing facility that would intermediate funds between 
the deficit and surplus units of the movement. 
C. Institutional Design 
Crepit unions are organized under rules and regulations that are fairly uniform wherever they 
exist, and the Niger CPECs are no exception. The CPECs are member-owned, member-operated, 
non-profit brganizations that operate as cooperative financial institutions. 
Crddit unions have a common bond that links their members. In open-bond or community-
based CU s, members are from the same community, village, or area of residence. In occupational 
or closed-bond CUs, members belong to the same profession, are engaged in the same occupation, 
or work in the same company. Thus, occupational CU s have a more homogeneous membership than 
community-based credit unions. Most credit unions in developed countries are closed-bond 
organizations, while most credit unions in developing countries are open-bond organizations. In 
Niger, mrn~t CUs are open-bond entities, i.e., community-based organizations. 
Each CPEC is run by a management committee of 16 members, on average, and one salaried 
manager (see Figure 2). The committee comprises a board of directors (seven members), a credit 
committee (three members), a loan monitoring committee (three members), and a training and 
marketing committee (three members). The cashier or general manager is the only paid employee. 
The credit committee analyzes all loan requests and makes the final decision on granting loans. Large 
size loan requests (greater or equal to CF AF 200,000 or US$ 400) are submitted to the board of 
I 
17 US$ 1= CFAF 500 
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directors for final approval. On average, one-third of management committee members are women 
in CPECs with mixed (male and female) membership. One-third of all CPECs have an all female 
membership base for religious reasons that would not allow men and women to belong to the same 
organizations (orthodox muslims). The manager of a CPEC is responsible for the day-to-day 
decisions, vrhile the ultimate control of the organization belongs to the general assembly of member-
1 owners. 1 
Figure 2. Generic Organizational Outline of Credit Unions (CEPCs) in Nige~ 
1996. 
J General Assembly 
I 
I I I I 
Monitbring Board of Credit Training and 
Committee Directors Committee Marketing 
(3 members) (7 members) (3 members) Committee (3 members) 
! I 
Manager 
(Salaried) 
D. Policies 
1. Membership policy 
Membership in the Niger CPECs is open to all community-based members. Most CPECs in 
Niger are community-based with a few in urban areas that are occupation-based (closed-bond) 
CPECs. Minimum membership fee requirements are CF AF 2,500 (US$ 5) in rural areas and CF AF 
3,500 (US$ 7) or higher in urban areas. The highest membership fee was CFAF 9,500 (US $19) at 
an urban CPEC. Some rural CPECs allow the membership fee to be paid in small increments. 
Membership fees include a minimum deposit of CF AF 500 (US$ 1) which buys the member a share. 
This allow~ even the poorest to become members. 
2. Share capital 
I 
Individual share capital in Niger CPECs cannot be traded or sold to others outside of the 
organization. Members get restitution of their shares upon resignation from the credit union. The 
return on ~hare capital is quite low in the Niger CPECs, although most organizations do pay 
dividends by distributing profits to members. Interest rebates on loans are not an option to reward 
members at the Niger CPECs. This policy prevents these organizations from turning into borrower-
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dominated credit unions, with net borrowers trying to obtain private benefits from other members by 
lowering iriterest rates on loans below a sustainable level. 
i 
3. 1 Lending policies 
Niger CPECs mobiliz.e deposits from their members and provide loans to their members only. 
The mem~r's share ownership is crucial in determining eligibility for credit and the size of loan. In 
general, credit union members have a right to borrow a multiple of their share, frequently two to one 
(2:1). In Niger, deposit accounts are used, in addition to shares, as the basis to establish the loan 
multiple of2 to 1, for at least the first year of operation. There is also a formal limit on the size of a 
single loan! 
Crdiit policies are similar in all CPECs and are generally more stringent during the first year 
in which the organization engages in credit activities. These initial requirements include: 
(a) a minimum deposit of CFAF 5,000 is required to apply for a loan; 
(b) at least three months membership is required; 
(c) a member has rights to a loan equivalent to a multiple of his/her deposit (frequently 2:1); and 
( d) a c6-signor who is also a member is required for any loan and must have sufficient funds in 
his/her savings account to cover the entire amount of the loan. 
After one year of activity, the CPECs can revise their loan policies. Thus, loan multiples can 
I 
change from 2: 1 to 3: 1. This reduces the effective interest rate implicitly charged on the net proceeds 
of the loan.1 The effective rate is twice the contractual rate when the multiple is only 2: 1 and one-and-
a-half times the contractual rate when the multiple is 3: 1. 
Most CPECs also find the co-signor requirement to be too restrictive and have already revised 
their loan pblicies to include acceptable tangible collateral. At this point, different CPECs accept land 
and other physical assets as collateral. In women-only CPECs, gold jewelry and woven cloth~ 
materials ate also accepted as collateral. In the second year of loan activity, the value of the collateral 
should cover 75 percent of the loan amount, while 50 percent should be covered in the third year and 
beyond. The collateral required needs to be a credible threat for contract enforcement. In this 
environment, with limited opportunities for formal contract enforcement, tangible collateral is inferior 
to a membbr's cosigning. Thus, the CPECs are taking more risks and would need to monitor their 
borrowers µiore closely to avoid any rise in default. 
E. Lending Technologies 
I 
Lo~s from the CPECs are granted to individuals only. There are no group loans. Loan 
characteristics are fairly similar across CPECs. The maximum amount that can be granted to a single 
member dtjpends on the CPEC, and it varies from CF AF 100,000 (US$ 200) to CF AF 1 million (US$ 
2,000). In some CPECs, not more than 10 percent of the loan portfolio can be given as a loan to a 
single individual. 
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In general, 70 percent of member deposits constitute the CPEC loanable fund base. The rest 
is kept as reiserves. In case of a liquidity shortage, all loan activity is terminated until additional loans 
outstanding are repaid. There have been instances of credit rationing due to a lack of funds in some 
CPECs. In some cases, not all members manage to get loans. In other cases, loan amounts disbursed 
are below the amounts authorized. Sometimes, after a liquidity shortage, priority is given to smaller 
loan applicants, as is often the case. This encourages members to demand smaller loan amounts in 
order not to be excluded. More vigorous deposit mobilization from net savers would reduce the 
incidence of these shortages. 
While some CPECs are short on liquidity, others, especially women-only CPECs, are 
frequently surplus units. It was expected that these CPECs would benefit from the intermediation 
role of the central finance facility. Women are known to be net savers in Africa and to value deposit 
services more than loans. The Niger CPECs place their excess liquidity with other financial 
institutions, e.g., commercial banks. It was believed that a central finance facility that intermediated 
funds between deficit and surplus units would offer the CPECs another alternative and likely better 
returns on pieir investments (in the mid 1990s, commercial banks in Niger were paying no interest 
on depositsJ. The central finance facility would lend directly to credit unions for a fee and would find 
the best investment alternatives for the liquidity it manages. This expectation assumes an independent 
central fin~ce facility with superior financial management expertise. 
All loans cany a 2 percent per month interest charge on the balance outstanding. Most loans 
usually require monthly installment payments of principal plus interest. Penalties (2 percent of 
principal due) are applicable in case of late payments. In special cases (loans for cattle rearing, for 
example) repayment of principal is due only at the end of the loan term (5-7 months), with interest 
payments still due every month. An application fee is also required with a loan application. The fee 
varies from 1 to 3 percent of the loan amount depending on the CPEC. When all interest costs and 
fees are taken into account, the effective interest rate in the CPECs varies from 48 to 54 percent per 
annum. These rates are not very different from those charged by the caisses villageoises in Mal~ 
where no savings requirements exist and which grant smaller loans. 
Given a nominal annual interest rate in all CPECs of 24 percent, a 2:1 loan multiple, and a 
loan application fee of 1-3 percent of the loan, the effective rate of interest can be estimated using the 
formula derveloped by Poyo (1989) for the Dominican Republic CU movement. The formula is: 
where: R = E 
RN= 
Tc= 
I = s 
<f>= 
(RN + Tc - ls<I>) R = 
E (1 - cj>) 
effective interest rate charged on loans, 
stated nominal rate of interest on loans, 
explicit transactions costs as a percentage of the loan amount, 
expected interest rate on savings paid by the credit union, and 
one over the loan multiple. 
There are no targeted loans in the Niger CPECs. Management is fully aware that money is 
fungible. Thus, loans in the CPECs are granted for a variety of purposes such as naming ceremonies, 
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weddings, health care, funerals, and school fees as well as for production purposes such as buying 
seed and inputs, or cattle rearing. The majority ofloans are granted for a year or less, and the average 
term to maturity of a loan in all CPECs is five months. 
All <;:PECs offer deposit services to their members. Individual members as well as groups can 
open a savipgs account at a CPEC. In addition to passbook current accounts, CPECs also have 
offered their members interest-bearing deposit accounts since 1996. Guarantee funds offered as 
additional collateral also earn interest at the CPECs. Members are rewarded at the end of the year 
when profits are redistributed and members receive a dividend proportional to their savings. Interest-
bearing depc)sit accounts, introduced in 1996, were an effort by management to encourage savings, 
especially fifom women, known to be potential net savers. When an organization relies heavily on 
deposits for its lending activity, it is essential to find ways to generate a continuous and increasing 
flow of deposits to meet loan demand. 
F. Outreach and Growth 
I 
' 
1. Breadth of outreach 
The Niger CPECs had achieved substantial growth and excellent results, exceeding all 
expectations and earlier projections (Ouattara et al., 1996b ). Up to 1995, membership grew at a rate 
of over 100 percent per year, as more than 10 CPECs were being created every year (Table 6). As 
of April 30, 1997, there were 65 CUs with 12,700 members, of whom 35 percent were women. A 
small proportion of the membership (2 percent) was made up of groups. Thus, average membership 
per CPEC was 195 members. 
54 
Table 6: Com~osition and Growth of CPEC Membershi~ in Niger, 1990-1996 
Numbers and Annual Rate of Growth (%) Shares(%) 
Endofyear Men Women Groups Total Men Women Groups Total 
1990 453 57 3 513 88.3 11.1 0.2 100 
-- -- -- --
1991 476 73 4 553 86.1 13.2 0.7 100 
(5.1) (28.1) (33.3) (7.8) 
1992 691 280 8 979 70.6 28.6 0.8 100 
(45.2) (283.6) (100.0) (77.0) 
1993 1,554 496 26 2,076 74.9 23.9 1.2 100 
(124.9) (77.1 ) (225.0) (112.1) 
1994 3,293 1,486 59 4,838 68.1 30.7 1.2 100 
(111.9) (199.6) (126.9) (133.0) 
1995a 3,711 1,617 62 5390 68.4 30.0 1.5 100 
-- -- -- --
1995 7,169 3,431 125 10,725 66.8 32.0 1.2 100 
(117.7) (130.9) (111.9) (121.7) 
1996 8,385 3,726 229 12,340 67.9 30.2 1.9 100 
(17.0) (8.6) (83.2) (15.1) 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
Notes: Percentages in parentheses are annual rates of growth. 
a: For March 31, 1995. 
Not applicable. 
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Loans outstanding, the number of loans, and deposits all grew rapidly in real terms, at more 
than 100 pt1fcent per year since the inception of the program. By April 1997, a total of CF AF 400 
million (US$ 800,000) had been mobilized in deposits, and there were 1,200 loans outstanding for 
CF AF 190 million (US$ 380,000). Accumulated, CF AF 650 million (US$ 1.3 million) had been 
granted as loans to 7,000 members, of whom 40 percent were women, from the beginning of the 
program. 
2. Growth in assets, member deposits, and shares 
GroWth in assets, deposits, and shares was impressive. In April 1997, the CPECs in Niger 
had accumulated CF AF 450 million in assets, surpassing the target of CF AF 128 million. In real 
terms, rates of growth in assets averaged over 100 percent per year from 1990 to 1996 {Table 7). 
Growth in savings deposits was even more dramatic, from CFAF 1 million in 1990 to CFAF 183.7 
million in 1996. Despite the devaluation of the CFAF, a real deposit growth of 244.5 percent per 
year was recorded in 1994, when CPEC membership increased by 133 percent. Due to the CPEC 
policy of all?wing only one share per member, shares in the CPECs have only kept up with a similar 
increase in n!iembership, averaging, nevertheless, a rate of 82 percent annual growth over the years. 
Table 7: Growth in Assets, Deposits, and Shares in Real Terms for Niger CPECs, 1990-
1996 
Amounts8 Annual Rate of Growth(%) 
End of Assets Deposits Shares Assets Deposits Shares 
Year 
1990 2,737,440 1,052,050 517,250 
1991 4,467,012 2,589,501 600,678 63.2 146.l 16.l 
1992 13,403,654 8,116,894 1,455,772 200.1 213.5 142.4 
1993 31,942,623 20,062,669 3,029,638 138.3 147.2 108.1 
1994 110,031,672 74,668,563 4,926,280 244.5 272.2 62.6 
1995 213,817,500 157,923,492 9,179,053 94.3 111.5 86.3 
1996 259,499,729 183,704,374 10,194,942 21.4 16.3 11.1 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
Notes: a Amounts measured in CF AF at constant 1990 prices. 
Not applicable. 
3. Growth in loans 
In 1996, the Niger CPECs granted 1,935 loans for a total amount of CFAF 183.7 million of 
constant 1990 purchasing power. This implies an average loan siz.e of CF AF 94,93 5 (US$ 190). The 
loan amounts granted ranged from a minimum of CF AF 5,000 to a maximum of one million. The 
growth in tµe number and amount of loans granted was remarkable (Table 8). The loan to savings 
ratio went from 8.7 percent in 1992, when the organizations first started granting loans, to 48.6 
percent in 1994, and to 75 percent in 1996. Average loan size increased 49 percent from 1994, when 
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it was CF AF 63,805 of constant 1990 purchasing power. As predicted in the OSU report, the 
creation of CPECs in active urban areas since then has generated demand for not only more loans but 
larger loans as well (Ouattara et al., 1996a). 
Table 8. Real Growth of the Niger CPECs Outstanding Loan Portfolio (1993-1996) 
End of y~ar Number ofloans Outstanding balances in Real rate of growth 
outstanding constant 1990 CF AF (%) 
1993 68 2,264,201 
1994 430 36,270,774 1,501.9 
1995 1,185 102,993,704 184.0 
1996 1,144 93,666,407 9.1 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
4. Depth of outreach 
i 
With an average loan size of US$ 190 and a ratio of average loan size over GDP per capita 
of 73 percent, the CPEC movement in Niger is undoubtedly reaching the poor, although not the 
poorest of the poor. Women constituted 30 percent of the CPEC membership and received almost 
40 percent of all loans granted. The average female loan size remained smaller, however, at CF AF 
76,000 COfl!lpared to an average loan size of CF AF 113,000 for men (Ouattara, 1996). 
' 
Female membership has remained at 30 percent since 1994. Most CPEC members are those 
men among the economically active poor in rural areas, where most CPECs are located. They are 
mostly fanners or microentrepreneurs. As of December 31, 1996 the average deposit amount in 
passbook accounts for all CPECs was CFAF 13,888 (US$ 28). This is an indicator of the poverty 
of their members. 
G. Sustainability 
1. Repayment performance 
The CPEC movement had a loan recovery record of 95 percent of total outstanding loans 
before 1996. However, 34 percent of loans outstanding were in arrears in 1996 (Table 9). As a 
result, management had to increase loan loss reserves 46-fold as a precautionary measure. This 
increase in arrears was a threatening development. Arrears constrain liquidity and make it impossible 
to respond to loan demand. The inability to respond to demand in turn weakens incentives to repay 
loans, leading to additional arrears. Demonstration effects further feed delinquency. Credit unions 
that do not! attract net depositors are very vulnerable to these effects. 
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Table 9: Time Profile of Loans Granted, Repaid, and in Arrears in the Niger CPE<S 
{1993-1996} 
End of Number of Balances Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan 
year loans outstanding amount not amount amount amount amount 
otitstanding (in CFAF) in arrears 0-2 months 2-6 months 6-12 more than 
(%) in arrears in arrears months in 12 months 
(%) (%) arrears in arrears 
(%) (%) 
1993 68 1,969,855 65.5 19.5 10.1 4.9 0.0 
1994 430 42,944,596 72.1 22.6 5.3 0.0 0.0 
1995 1,185 134,818,758 72.0 17.2 9.9 0.8 0.1 
1996 1,144 129,072,309 65.7 5.3 15.3 10.1 3.6 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
2. Self-sufficiency: PEARLS 
WOCCU created a rating system for CUs to be used as a management as well as a supervisory 
tool. The credit union performance rating system is now based on PEARLS (Protection, Effective 
financial structure, Asset quality, Rate of return and costs, Liquidity, and Signs of growth). It is 
similar to ~e CAMEL system (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings 
record, and Liquidity position) used to assess the performance of banks. 
The PEARLS system uses 36 financial ratios to assess the viability of the CU as a cooperative 
financial institution (see Annex 2 to this chapter). Operational efficiency in the PEARLS system is 
measured by ratios such as R7 (Total Gross Income Margin/Total Average Assets) and R 10(Net 
Earnings/Average Total Assets). The R7 measures the total income margin generated before 
subtracting overhead expenses, loan loss provisions, and other extraordinary items. In Niger, the R7 
increased from 2.0 percent in 1990 to 11.6 percent in 1994 (Shaw, 1998). In 1996, the R7 was 14 
percent, an indication of the CPECs' increasing ability to generate sufficient income to cover 
operational (overhead) expenses. 
The R10 measures the average income yield for productive assets in the balance sheet. An R10 
of 14 percent was recorded in 1996, indicating decent net earnings by the Niger CPECs. In addition, 
the return on assets (ROA) of 8.6 percent and return on equity (ROE) of 37 percent in 1996 are 
above industry standards of a 2 percent minimum for ROA and at least 15 percent for ROE (Table 
10). Fin~cial self-sufficiency is the ability to generate sufficient income to cover operational and 
financial costs of the organization. Financial self-sufficiency can be captured by the net operating 
margin. After several years of negative net operating margins, in 1996 this ratio finally reached a 
positive 1.7 percent in the Niger CPECs (Table 10). A positive, although very small net operating 
margin reveals that the Niger CPECs are finally covering their costs with income derived from their 
loan operations. 
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Table 10. Financial Indicators, Profitability, and Efficiency Measures for the CPIC 
Movement in Niger, 1993-1996. 
Financial expenses (CF AF) 
Operating expenses (CF AF)a 
Total expenses (CF AF) 
I 
Financial incomeb 
Operating income 
Total income (CF AF) 
Net income (CF AF) 
Financial assets 
Average t~tal assetsc 
Average total equityc 
Total liabilitiesc 
Average outstanding portfolio (CF AF) 
Operating expenses/average 
outstanding portfolio (%) 
Operational self-sufficiencyd (%) 
ROAe (%) 
ROEr(%) 
Gross financial marging (%) 
Net operating marginh (%) 
Source: WOCCU/MCPEC report 
1993 
850,000 
1,839,233 
2,689,233 
621,608 
2,560,677 
4,082,667 
1,393,434 
22,789,017 
19,840,543 
6,712,951 
18,499,322 
129,437,205 
1.4 
23.1 
7.0 
20.8 
-1.2 
-10.4 
1994 
5,920,000 
11,562,464 
17,482,464 
6,503,035 
12,199,660 
21,564,904 
4,082,440 
104, 734,253 
79,042,121 
21,757,374 
94,354,103 
22,457,226 
51.5 
37.2 
5.2 
18.8 
0.7 
-13.9 
1995 1996 
7,739,338 249,072 
26,965,213 25,980,967 
34,704,551 26,230,039 
21,240,712 31,529,593 
32,357,361 34,845,959 
52,320,031 53,557,469 
17,615,480 27,327,430 
244,737,272 317,916,878 
205,047,940 318,738,867 
49,197,826 73,892,118 
212,095,641 255,653,064 
88,881,677 131,945,534 
30.3 
61.2 
8.6 
35.8 
6.6 
-6.6 
19.7 
120.2 
8.6 
37.0 
9.8 
1.7 
Notes: a: Operating expenses are equal to personnel expenses, and administrative expenses, 
b: 
c: 
d: 
e: 
f 
g: 
h: 
including depreciation of fixed assets. They do not include financial costs and loan 
loss provisions. 
Financial income = income from interest and loan fees. 
Average of first-of-year and end-of-year balances. 
Operational self-sufficiency= Financial income /Financial+ Operating Costs+ Loan 
loss provision. 
ROA= Net income/Average total assets. 
ROE= Net income/Average total equity. 
Gross Financial Margin= (Financial income - Financial costs) I Average total assets. 
Net Operating Margin = Gross financial margin - Operating costs I Average total 
assets. 
Another indication of the sustainability of micro finance organizations is the extent to which 
they rely on outside assistance for their operations. This can be measured by the Subsidy Dependence 
Index (SDI). The SDI measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate 
required to compensate an organization for the elimination of subsidies in a given year while keeping 
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its return on equity equal to the approximate non-concessional borrowing cost. The index assumes, 
for simplicity, that an increase in the on-lending interest rate is the only change made to compensate 
for the loss of subsidy. An SDI of zero assumes that an organization has achieved full self.. 
sustainability. An SDI of 100 percent indicates that a doubling of the average on-lending interest rate 
is required if subsidies are to be eliminated (Yaron, 1994). 
I 
The SDI figures obtained using the information from published financial statements indicate 
that in 1996, an increase of 12.1 percent in the on-lending interest rate or a 3 percentage point 
increase would be required to eliminate the subsidy received by the Niger CPEC movement (see 
Annex 1 to this chapter). That is, the CPECs would have to increase their nominal interest rate from 
24 to 27 percent to eliminate all subsidies. This is quite a modest increase from the interest rates the 
CPECs are currently charging on loans. The possibility of such an increase would be highly 
dependent, however, on the PARMEC law, which sets a cap on the interest rates microfinance 
organizations can charge on loans. Under the present law and a cap of 30 percent in effect in 1996, 
the Niger ~PECs would have been able to implement the interest rate policy needed to become 
independent from subsidy. 
H. Ownership and Governance 
Niger CPECs are member-owned and member-operated organizations. While paid managers 
are responsible for the day to day decisions, the ultimate control of the organization belongs to the 
general assembly of member-owners. 
In general, the owner-client structure of CUs can create conflicts among borrowers, 
depositors, and management. Opposition between net borrowers and net depositors for control of 
the organifation can lead to a borrower-dominated or depositor-dominated CU. In a borrower-
dominated CU, although they are usually a small segment of the membership, the net borrowers 
capture control of the CU, to obtain private benefits at the expense of other members, i.e., net 
depositors. They seek private benefits by pressuring for the adoption of low interest rates, relaxed 
collateral requirements, and less rigorous loan recovery practices. 
The Niger CPECs had so far managed to avoid this rent-seeking behavior and to stay neutral, 
i.e., not favoring one group over the other. They had avoided borrower domination by being 
mandated to adopt collateral requirements and interest rate policies that do not subsidize net 
borrowers. 
Th¢ CPEC governance is characterized by a democratic structure with a one person, one vote 
rule, which implies that voting powers cannot be accumulated by individuals regardless of how many 
shares they own. CPEC members also remain the sole residual claimants of the assets of the 
organization. Unfortunately, democratic control in a credit union may not result in optimum levels 
of monitodng and internal control (Chaves, 1994). The collective action of a majority of members 
can bias the allocation of credit in detriment of depositors. This threat constrains the potential growth 
of deposits. In an effort to compensate for these inadequate incentives, in the Niger CPECs, 
managers 'are paid employees of the organization. This has been positively correlated with 
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performance (Ouattara et al., 1996a). Also, an increasing number of net depositors, attracted by the 
new savings products, will help in overcoming these governance weaknesses. 
I. Issues for the Future 
After seven years of activities, the Niger credit union movement finally achieved financial self-
sufficiency in 1996. The movement is still dependent, however, on operational subsidies. WOCCU 
believes that the movement still needs three-to-five years of technical assistance and training to 
achieve full maturity. This situation is consistent with the experience of the caisses villageoises, 
which needed 11 years to evolve into a long-awaited status of mature organizations. 
According to the results of an OSU study, several elements have positively affected the 
performance and sustainability of the Niger CPECs (Ouattara et al., 1996b ). In particular, CPEC 
members are comfortable with the use of market rates of interest, which are crucial in determining 
the long-term sustainability of the CPECs in Niger. Encouraging more deposits from members, 
especially \\fOmen, generating larger loan portfolios, and good repayment performance will allow the 
CPECs to remain financially self-sufficient. Attracting more women will positively influence the 
organizations, as women appear to value savings even more than they value loan services. 
' 
Nevertheless, one final issue merits comments in these closing remarks. In the final year of 
documentation (1996), there was a notable decline in the rate of growth of loans, deposits, and share 
capital (Tables 7 and 8). Further evidence presented in Table 9 shows a rising rate of arrears in 1996. 
Moreover, a non-negligible share of these total arrears are aging, implying the threat of default. The 
decline in growth is not surprising for a movement entering the sixth year of activity. A rise in the 
aging of arrears, however, is another matter. This situation suggests that the sustainability of the 
movement was really not guaranteed. 
Additional financial information on the Niger CUs is shown in Table 11 (consolidated balance 
sheet) and, Table 12 (consolidated income statement). These data show that growth was brisk 
through 1995, followed by stagnation in 1996. Very rapid growth of the loan portfolio in 1995 was 
followed by some reduction, while deposits continued to grow unabated and new liabilities were 
issued. The arrears observed in 1996 may have thus resulted from too rapid growth Because of these 
arrears, reserves for loan losses sustantially increased in 1996. 
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Table 11. Consolidated Balance Sheet for the CPEC Movment in Niger, 1993-96 {CFAF) 
12-31-93 12-31-94 12-31-95 12-31-96 
ASSETS 1 
Cash and c~h equivalents 20,614,842 61,002,456 109,082,897 175,436,914 
Accounts receivable 198,000 0 0 13,403,175 
I 
Loans 1,969,855 42,944,596 134,818,758 129,072,309 
Interest rec~ivable 5,330 787,201 835,617 0 
Miscellaneous receivables 990 0 0 4,480 
Fin~ncial assets 22,789,017 104,734,253 244,737,272 317,916,878 
Fixed assetS (building and 
equipmeht) 
I 
5,086,451 25,474,520 35,149,835 39,673,749 
TOTAL ASSETS 27,875,468 130,208, 773 279,887,107 357 ,590,627 
LIABILI'(IES AND EQUITY 
Deposits (savings) 18,440,597 92,918,078 206, 721,851 253,144,628 
I 
Interest payable 0 1,435,000 5,366,015 0 
Other liabilities 58,725 1,025 7,775 2,508,436 
Legal resemres 97,279 515,928 1,642,916 4,032,048 
Contribution to construction 315,000 625,275 874,775 1,545,200 
Credit lossireserve 38,599 123,988 1,441,003 5,768,803 
Other resetve 0 0 26,600 6,613,449 
I 
Total Liabilities 18,950,200 95,619,294 216,080,935 273,612,564 
Shares 2,652,285 5,831,715 12,015,380 14,048,630 
Retained earnings 130,058 74,979 210,752 4,418,249 
Year-end net income 1,436,024 4,082,440 17,615,480 27,327,430 
Equipment subsidy 
I 
4,706,901 24,600,345 33,964,560 38,183,754 
Total Equity 8,925,268 34,589,479 63,806,172 83,978,063 
TOTAL JtIABILITIES 
ANDE~UITY 27,875,468 130,208, 773 279,887,107 357,590,627 
Source: WOCCU-Niger reports. 
I 
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Table 12. Consolidated Income Statement for the CPEC Movement in Niger, 1993-" 
~CFAF} 
12-31-93 12-31-94 12-31-95 12-31-96 
INCOME1 
Loan interest income 454,389 4,960,635 15,860,620 26,486,023 
Penalty interest income 4,930 236,828 1,538,267 1,772,493 
Interest from bank placements 111,719 395,657 1,193,035 330,846 
Interest from central finance facility 0 0 0 3,838 
Loan application fees 50,570 909,915 2,648,790 2,936,393 
Entry fees 1,222,100 3,004,485 6,269,415 2,662,110 
Miscellaneous income 716,969 2,692,140 4,847,234 654,256 
Operational subsidies 1,521,990 9,365,244 19,962,670 18,711,510 
TOTAL INCOME 4,082,667 21,564,904 52,320,031 53,557,469 
! 
EXPENS~S 
Materials 623,998 2,876,171 5,171,698 625,750 
Travel expenses 12,582 232,445 445,548 777,970 
Training expenses 0 0 0 13,325 
Meeting expenses 21,490 56,300 237,580 636,231 
Promotion expenses 484,550 2,203,260 3,116,695 2,289,565 
Contributfons and grants 0 0 0 49,530 
Maintenance expense 0 0 769,250 0 
Miscellan¢ous losses 0 395 15,802 48,589 
Salary expenses 146,000 3,371,235 9,655,400 12,923,155 
Interest expenses 850,000 5,920,000 7,739,338 249,072 
Depreciation expenses 0 969,250 3,229,445 0 
Miscellaneous expenses 550,613 1,853,408 4,323,795 8,616,852 
TOTAL EXPENSES 2,689,233 17,482,464 34,704,551 26,230,039 
NET INCOME 1,393,434 4,082,440 17,615,480 27,327,430 
Source: WOCCU-Niger reports. 
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ANNEXl 
Subsidy Dependence Index 
The fonnula for the subsidy dependence index (SDI) is: 
where: 
and: 
SDI= _s_ 
LP* i 
S=A(m-c)+[(E*m)-p]+K 
S = annual subsidy received by the organization; 
A= organization concessional borrowed funds outstanding (annual average); 
m = interest rate the organization would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if access to 
borrowed concessional funds were eliminated; 
c = weighted average annual concessional rate of interest actually paid by the organization on its 
avt1rage annual concessional borrowed funds outstanding; 
E = average annual equity; 
P = reported annual profit, before tax (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss provisions, 
inflation); 
K = the sum of all other annual subsidies received by the organization (such as partial or complete 
covl-erage of operational costs); 
LP= average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the organization; and 
i = weighted average on-lending interest rate earned on the loan portfolio. 
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Table 13. SDI Estimates for the CPEC Movement in Niger, 1994-96 
Item 1994 1995 1996 
Concessional borrowing = A a 0 0 0 
Concessio~l rate of interest paid = c (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Market lending rate = m (%) 16.75 16.75 16.75 
Annual average equity = Eb 21,757,374 49,197,826 73,892,118 
Subsidy on equity = (E*m) 3,644,360 8,240,636 12,376,930 
Profits = P (losses) 4,082,440 17,615,480 27,327,430 
Grants and Benefits = Kc 9,365,244 19,962,670 18,711,510 
Total subsidy= S 8,927,164 10,587,826 3,761,010 
Revenue from lending= LP*id 6,107,378 20,047,677 31,194,909 
SDI(%) 146.2 52.8 12.1 
Source: CPECs financial statements 
Note: a: No concessional borrowing took place. 
b: All amounts are in CFAF. 
c: Reported figures in the income statement. 
d: Revenue includes loan interest income, penalty interest income, and revenues from 
loan application fees. 
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ANNEX2 
List of Performance Indicators Comprising the PEARLs Tool. 
P = Protection 
P 1 Provision for Loan Losses/Delinquency > 12 months 
P2 Provision for Loan Losses I Total Delinquency 
E = Effective Financial Structure 
E1 Loans I Total Assets 
E2 Stock and Bonds Investments I Total Assets 
E3 Other Investments I Total Assets 
E4 Liquid Cash Investments I Total Assets 
Es Deposits I Total Assets 
E6 External Borrowing I Total Assets 
E7 Shares I Total Assets 
Es Institutional Capital I Total Assets 
A = Asset Quality 
A1 Total Loan Delinquency I Total Loan Portfolio 
A2 Non-performing Assets in Liquidation I Total Assets 
A3 Annual Loan Charge-offs I Average Loan Portfolio 
A4 Accumulated Recoveries from Charged-off Loans/ Accumulated Loans Charged-off 
As ' Non-earning Assets I Total Assets 
~ Institutional Capital+ Zero Cost Liabilities I Non-earning Assets 
A7 Financial Stabilization Counterpart (Stabilization Fund) 
R = Rates of Return and Cost 
R1 Total Loan Income I Average Loan Portfolio 
R2 i Total Liquid Cash Investments Income I Average Liquid Cash Investments 
R3 Total Stock and Bond Investment Income I Average Stock and Bond Investment 
R4 Total Other Investment Income I Average Other Investment Income 
Rs Total Interest Cost on Savings Deposits I Average Savings Deposits 
~ Total Interest (Dividend) Cost on Shares I Average Shares 
R7 ! Total Gross Income Margin I Total Average Assets 
Rs i Total Operational (Overhead) Expenses I Total Average Assets 
~ Total Loan Loss Provision Expense I Average Total Assets 
R 10 Net Earnings I Average Total Assets 
L = Liquidity 
L1 . [Total Liquid Cash Investments - Immediate Obligations] I Savings Deposits 
L2 • Corporate (CFF) Liquidity Reserves I Savings Deposit 
L3 [Cash on Hand+ Checking Accounts] I Total Assets 
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S =Signs of Growth 
S1 Growth in Total Assets 
S2 Growth in Loans 
S3 Growth in Deposits 
S4 Growth in Shares 
S5 Growth in Institutional Capital 
S6 Growth in Membership 
_Source:,David C. Richardson (WOCCU Advisor). 
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VI 
VILLAGE BANKING PROGRAMS 
A. The Original Village Banking Model 
The. village banking model was first developed during the 1980s in Bolivia by John Hatch, 
Rupert Scofield, and Aquiles Lanao (Hatch, 1987). Hatch then established the Foundation for 
International Community Assistance (FINCA) in 1984, to expand the village banking model to the 
rest of Lath~ America. With his assistance, other organizations adopted the same or similar models 
later on. In 1995, village banking was being implemented in at least 28 countries worldwide, 
including 12 African countries (Nelson et al., 1996). The model has been introduced in several new 
countries in the past few years. 
Village banks are organized by local implementing agencies, which are local partners of 
international, mostly American, non-government organizations (NGOs) such as Katalysis, Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), World Relief, Freedom from Hunger (FFH), Save the Children Fund (SCF), 
and FINCA International itself. Implementation in developing countries of the village banking 
methodology by Northern NGOs other than FINCA, and especially in Africa, has gone througi 
numerous adaptations and innovations. In order to better understand the importance and impact of 
these innovations, it is convenient to start with a review of the original model designed by FINCA. 
These changes mean that, in many instances, the original model no longer accurately 
represents most village banking programs. This learning process has been strong at FIN CA itself and 
at other emulators. Some of these changes have contributed to greater similarities of village banking 
programs with other West African micro finance organizations. 
1. Organizational design 
According to the original model, village banking a la FIN CA works with groups of 30-()() 
members, usually all women. As soon as the village bank is inaugurated, it receives its first loan from 
the implementing agency (the local headquarters of FINCA or its affiliate) for on-lending to tre 
individual members of the village bank. The sponsoring agency spends one to three months in setting 
up each bank, organizing the election of a management committee and training its members, as well 
as developing the rules and regulations to govern the village bank. 
The first individual loan (usually US$ 50) is repaid on a weekly basis in equal installments of 
principal and interest over a four-month period. The village bank collects these payments at regular 
meetings and, at the end of the 16th week, it repays the entire loan principal plus interest to the 
implement~g agency. 
The funds circulating back and forth between the implementing agency and the village bank 
for loans to members constitute the external account. If the village bank repays in full, it is eligible 
for a second loan. If the village bank is unable to pay the amount due, the implementing agency 
68 
withholds expansion of further credit until the bank becomes current. Thus, one single borrower in 
arrears can prevent the entire village bank membership from getting its next loan. To avoid this 
situation, the village bank's management may opt to draw from the members' savings to cover the 
loan in default. 
This use of savings results in a weak form of joint liability among the membership, which 
creates some incentives for peer monitoring and contract enforcement among village bank members. 
This strucTIµ"e of incentives is subject, however, to the same kind of advantages and disadvantages 
of group lending. Peer monitoring constrains opportunistic behavior, but borrowing groups may also 
experience domino effects, thus threatening with generalized default, particularly in the presence of 
systemic shocks. Because village bank groups tend to be larger than solidarity groups,free riding 
is more likely, and monitoring is correspondingly weaker. Some village banking programs in West 
Africa have addressed this problem by creating smaller solidarity sub-groups within a village bank. 
2. Ownership and governance 
The elected management committee makes all investment decisions about the accumulated 
savings, according to established rules and procedures adopted by the village bank. The committee 
also overseJs and documents all transactions at the village bank. The implementing agency's role in 
the management of the bank is to support the leadership and facilitate decision-making among the 
village bank's membership. Agents from the implementing agency attend all weekly meetings initially, 
but their participation declines as the bank's management capacity grows. The village bank relies on 
group governance and members of the group remain the owners and residual claimants of the village 
bank's assets. 
3. Financial services 
Access to credit at the village bank is linked to savings, and the amount of subsequent loans 
increases p11oportionately to the amount of savings mobilized by the village bank from each individual 
member. In the original model, members were required to save 20 percent of their current loan each 
cycle. Their next loan can then be as much as their previous loan plus the accumulated savings. 
Borrowers ~an receive successive loans until they reach an external account loan ceiling of US$ 300, 
which occms usually after approximately three years. 
The rigidity of the lending technology, justified by the high costs associated with very small 
loans, has been a cause of concern among village banking practitioners. They have been seeking ways 
to develop new products that would introduce more flexibility into this lending technology. The link 
of savings and loans has been kept, but implementation has become more flexible. Ceilings on loan 
size have disappeared in many programs. 
Member savings plus repayment of principal and interest on the loan with funds from the 
external account are kept by the bank and constitute the internal account. Growth of the internal 
account follows growth in savings activity. The village bank does not pay any interest on savings but 
members may receive dividends from internal account earnings. The village bank can in fact use other 
means to increase internal account funds, such as charging extra interest on member loans from the 
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Figure 3. 
Village Bank 
FINCA Village Banking Design: Creating NGO Affiliates 
FINCA: Creating NGO Affiliates 
FINCA International 
FINCA Affiliate 
external account, using member savings for lending activities at rates and terms determined by the 
membership, making other investments in enterprise or community development activities, and 
charging fees and fines to members who fail to adhere to its rules. 
Member weekly repayments of loan principal are held by the village bank until the end of the 
loan cycle and can be immediately re-lent from the internal account. Thus, the funds are constantly 
circulating within the community and the internal account increases while the external account serves 
to stimulate .internal account activity. The designers of the FIN CA village banking model estimated 
that, at the end of three years, the internal account funds would be sufficient to meet all members' 
demand, re~ulting in graduation of the village bank. At that point, the implementing agency would 
withdraw its funds and use them to start a new village bank. Graduation results, however, in an 
adverse structure of incentives. It implies the lack of permanency of the relationship with the external 
source of fupds, thereby reducing incentives to repay as graduation time approaches. For this reason, 
many programs have not implemented the graduation rule. 
4. Evolution of the model 
Key features of the original village banking model are standardization, collective liability, and 
credit linked to savings. Lending policies and products are tailored not to meet individual demand 
but to attract the poorest, especially women. This village banking model has been subject to several 
transformations, to respond to member's demand and to adapt it to local circumstances, as is the case 
with the programs visited for this case study in West Africa. Changes made to the original model 
include the revision of loan policies, addition of non-financial services, changes in external and 
internal account practices, and abandonment of graduation. 
In ¢ffect, some of the changes have contributed to making these village banking programs 
share several similarities with other West African microfinance organizations such as the caisses 
villageoises. Graduation, for example, has been a major issue in the West African village banking 
programs. 
1 
The implementing agencies have not been willing to withdraw their funds at the end of 
the cycle at all, allowing the program to continue operating with each village bank beyond tre 
originally woposed three years. At the FFH program in Mali, graduation for a village bank member 
means beiq.g able to afford individual membership into the Kafo Jiginew, the partner credit union. 
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Table 14. Village Banking Methodology Compared: The Standard Model versw 
Adaptations in West Africa. 
Methodology Standard FINCA Model Adaptations 
1. Organization 
Membership 30-50 members 16-432 members 
Structure 
Gender 
2. External Account 
Use of loan funds 
First-cycle 1<1>an 
maximum 
Loan ceiling 
Interest 
Term of the loan cycle 
Repayment Schedule 
3. lnt,rnal Account 
Use 
Savings 
Control and ,monitoring 
Single group 
Targeted exclusively to women 
Trading 
US$50 
US$ 300 
To cover operating costs 
16 weeks 
Equal weekly installments of 
principal, interest, and savings 
Individual and group enterprises 
Forced savings, 20 percent ofloan 
amount, tied to new loan size, 
restricted access for village 
capitalization 
Members 
Lending 100 percent 
lent 
4. Graduation After 9 cycles and US$ 300 limit 
reached. Village bank becomes 
self-capitalized, self-managed 
Sources: S~ep Network and OSU field visits. 
i 
Solidarity groups of 3-8 within the village 
bank 
Men and women 
Trade, microenterprise, agriculture 
US$50 
US$ 300 and upwards 
Positive real rate of interest 
16-24 weeks 
Weekly, bi-weekly, monthly 
Deposit in bank account, loans to others, 
group enterprises 
Forced savings, voluntary savings, 
minimum amount required, formal bank 
deposits, withdrawal policies, not 
necessarily tied to loans 
Implementing agency (CRS, FFH, SCF), 
partner financial institution, and members, 
MIS system, formal bank account 
Remain clients of program, higher loan 
levels, become client of partner financial 
organizations 
Loart ceilings have been revisited as have also been the frequency of loan repayments and the 
mechanisms to increase loan amounts (see Table 14). This case study reviews the performance of 
several programs that have included these transformations in their operations. The sections below 
analyze the programs run in West Africa by three US-based NGOs, namely, Freedom from Hunger 
(FFH) and Save the Children Foundation (SCF) in Mali and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
program in Benin. 
B. Freedom From Hunger and the Kafo Jiginew's Village Banking Program 
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B.1 Kafo Jiginew Credit Union Network 
I 
Freedom from Hunger initiated its village banking methodology, Credit with Education, in 
1989. All vilfage banking programs sponsored by FFHare carried out through partnerships with local 
microfinance1 organizations, including credit unions (CUs). The first experiment of a village banking 
program implemented through a credit union network in Africa was started in Burkina Faso in 1993 
with the Reseau des Caisses Populaires du Burkina Faso (RCPB). As of June 1997, the RCPB was 
reaching 18,
1
13 members, over 12,000 of whom had an outstanding loan. The program expanded 
later on to FUCEC-Togo, the Togolese credit union network. In Mali, FFH has been working with 
two CU networks since 1996. They are the Kafo Jiginew and Nyesigiso. The Kafo Jiginew program 
operates in the region of Koutiala, and it is reviewed for this case study. 
Cre~it with Education is a strategy that combines village banking with low-cost, non-formal 
education, to assist women to build their productive assets, accumulate savings, acquire self-
confidence, and improve basic business and family survival (health, child survival, and nutrition) skills 
(Stack, 1997). The ultimate objective is to improve nutrition and food security for the most vulnerable 
groups amohg the poor. 
' 
Sin~ 1989, FFH has focused on developing and adapting this strategy in eight countries. Nine 
ofFFH's 14 local partners are financial institutions, and four of them are credit union networks. This 
case study :focuses on the financial dimensions of the FFH strategy, and it ignores important non-
financial impacts (MkNelly, 1997). Issues related to the advantages and disadvantages of combining 
financial and non-financial services are also ignored. 
I 
1. Organizational design 
The Kafo Jiginew is a network of credit unions located in Koutiala, a cotton-producing region 
in Southern ,Mali. Jiginew means granary in the Bambara language. Kafo Jiginew means the union 
of all granaries, and it was created as a federation in 1988, by the union of five credit unions, with help 
of a consortillin of several international donors from Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the French Credit 
Cooperative Federation (Consortium Europeen pour le Credit Cooperatif Malien). Until 1994, 
technical assistance for the credit unions was provided by the French. 
Koutiala was chosen because it is a relatively rich area, due to the cotton growing activities. 
The Kafo Jiginew is now fully owned and managed by Malian members, staff, and board. The higher 
literacy rate of the population was also a favorable factor in this choice. The credit unions needed a 
potential mdmbership of people with relatively stable and continuous income flows. The vast majority 
of the population lives in villages in the rural areas. 
A credit union or Jiginew is created only where CMDT, Mali's Cotton Marketing Board, 
operates. A Jiginew usually belongs to several villages, ten on average, which in tum are part of a 
ZAER, i.e., a grouping of villages determined by CMDT for cotton marketing purposes. A ZAER 
covers a radius of 15-20 kms. The choice of the village to house the credit union is made during a 
general ass~mbly of potential members and the federation. 
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All construction materials and expenses for an office are the responsibility of the villagers. 
After the physical structure is in place, the new credit union receives furniture, other office materials 
and free technical assistance for three years from the federation, i.e., the Kafo Jiginew. After that 
period, fees for all services are gradually charged to the credit union. 
As of December 31, 1997, Kafo Jiginew had a network of 76 credit unions and 11 regional 
unions in three regions: Koutiala, Sikasso, and Fana. The Kafo Jiginew, the federation, is a central 
financing facility as well as provider of technical assistance for member credit unions. 
The system follows the standard COOPEC (Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit) structure, 
according to which members are both clients and owners. This management structure consists of three 
levels: the governance structure of each credit union, regional unions of 8-10 credit unions, and the 
Kafo Jiginew. 
Each credit union is run by two managers, a board of directors, a credit committee, and a 
supervisory committee, all elected at the annual general assembly meeting. The board of directors is 
made up of 12-15 members from all villages that belong to the credit union, to assure a fair 
participation by all. At least one person from each participating village is selected. Members of the 
board of directors are the president, vice-president, secretary general, vice secretary general, treasurer, 
vice treasurer, credit officer, comptroller, conflict officer, and several organizers. 
The board of directors is also the executive body of the organization, and it sets the agenda 
for the general assembly of members. Members of the board of directors meet on a monthly basis. 
The board selects two cashiers among villagers to manage the cash flow in the credit union. A credit 
committee, which reviews all loan applications, and a supervisory committee are formed by members 
of the board of directors. 
The credit committee is made up of four members, of whom three are permanent. Having one 
non-permanent member allows the credit union to give the opportunity to other members to join the 
credit committee at some point. Members have to be from different villages to minimize any bias and 
favoritism. The supervisory body has two to three members, and it is the control body of the credit 
union. Members of both boards are elected for three years and can be reelected indefinitely. Only 
one-third of the officials can be replaced during an election each year. 
Manager salaries depend on the profits made by the credit union but cannot exceed CF AF 
500,000 (US$ 1,000) per year. Income generated from photograph fees paid by members when 
registering are used to pay managers an additional per-diem for food and gas on the days the credit 
union opens. Managers of urban credit unions receive a monthly salary of at least CF AF 20,000 (US$ 
40). At the time of the case study, the average monthly salary in all three urban credit unions was 
CF AF 35,000 (US$ 70), which is slightly higher than the minimum wage in Mali. 
Fee income is also used to compensate board members, who receive a per-diem every time they 
meet. After five years, the board of directors receive CFAF 1,500 (US$ 3) for every auditing function 
they perform. These incentive schemes that tie compensation to results of the organization are 
important to motivate managers, who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the credit union 
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although overall control of the organization rests with board members. Performance-based 
compensation makes the incentives of the managers compatible with the interests of the organization. 
Regional unions meet regularly to discuss issues of common interest. The Kafo Jiginew, the 
I 
federation, is '1- central financing facility for all member credit unions. It intermediates funds between 
deficit and surplus units. Surplus units can retain from CF AF 500,000 to CF AF 1 million (US$ 1,000 -
2,000) in theif" local organizations for loans in periods of low loan activity and up to CF AF 10 million 
(US$ 20,000) during high loan granting periods such as the month of June. The federation manages 
the liquidity of the entire network as a single entity. There is no intermediary structure between the 
federation a.pd local credit unions. It also provides training to the board, cashiers, and committee 
members of the CUs. 
2. : Policies 
The Kafo Jiginew is supervised by the West African Central Bank (BCEAO) and by the Malian 
Ministry of finance under the P ARMEC law. 
Kafd Jiginew credit unions open once to twice a week. They mobilize their own savings to 
grant loans 'to members. People from different villages can belong to the same credit union. To 
become a member and have access to loans, a membership fee of CF AF 5,000 (US $ 10) is required 
and may be paid in four installments to accommodate the poorest. Women can have access to a loan 
after paying just CF AF 1,000 (US $ 2) for their membership fee. They are expected to eventually 
complete payment of the fee in the future. A minimum savings of CF AF 5,000 (the initial share 
payment) giyes access to a CF AF 50,000 (US $ 100) loan. Credit amounts are thus linked to savings. 
Deposit products include current accounts, which require a minimum of CF AF 1,000 and pay 
3-4 percent ~ual interest, compounded quarterly. Term deposit accounts have a minimum balance 
requirement of CF AF 25,000 (US $ 50) to be kept for at least a year and pay 4-6.5 percent annual 
interest. This rate is only slightly higher (one point difference) than those offered by commercial 
banks. Thef are much lower than the rates paid by the caisses villageoises on deposits. 
The, loan portfolio is funded by member shares, term deposit accounts, and 50 percent of 
current accoUn.ts. In recent years, outside funds borrowed from BNDA, the Agricultural Development 
Bank, have been used to complement deposit funds and have also allowed the credit unions to grant 
larger and ldnger-term loans. Several loan products are offered by the credit unions at different rates 
of interest tq reflect the term to maturity of the loans. Longer-term loans carry lower interest rates. 
Loan products are: 
(a) sho~-term, small loans granted for three months at 4 percent monthly interest, 
(b) agricultural loans granted for eight to ten months at 2 percent per month, 
( c) equipment loans granted for two to three years at 1.2 percent per month, and 
( d) crei(it with education (FFH village bank loans) granted for 16 weeks at 3 percent per month. 
Short-term, small loans are for social and emergency purposes and do not require the approval 
of the entir~ credit committee. The decision can be taken by the president alone. Agricultural loans 
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are disbursed every year in June and July, to allow farmers time to buy seed for the coming planting 
season. Equipment loans are granted to buy carts and farm animals. Some small loans are also 
granted to young microentrepeneurs in urban areas. There is high seasonality in loan granting an:.l 
repayments' at the credit unions for the most popular loan product, i.e., agricultural loans. In fact, 
most farmers are engaged in the same agricultural activity, i.e., cotton growing and a bad year in 
cotton may disrupt credit union activities. This reflects the obstacles to financial intermediation in a 
risky environment. 
3. Lending technologies 
Kafd Jiginew credit unions grant loans mainly to individuals but also to some groups. Credit 
is tied to savings and individual members can obtain loan amounts up to ten times their savings 
balances. The ratio, considerably higher than the traditional 2: 1 for credit unions, allows members in 
practice to only get loans up to a maximum determined by individual credit unions. Collateral 
requiremen~s for loans include physical assets such as land, agricultural and other equipment, a co-
signor, or a village association. 
It is worth noting that the credit unions were first created and membership gathered through 
associations vi/lageoises (A Vs), village groups formed for the marketing of cotton. Thus, the majority 
of male credit union members are also AV members, through which they sell and receive income for 
their products. Thus, the use of village arrangements, an important factor in the early life of the credit 
unions, cor).tinues to play a key role in contract enforcement and thereby the performance of tre 
organizations. In an effort to boost the female membership of the credit unions, Kafo Jiginew 
welcomed the opportunity to add a village banking credit with education program to its activities in 
1995. 
B.2 Freedom From Hunger's Credit with Education Program 
The Freedom from Hunger credit with education program is primarily designed to improve 
I 
nutrition and food security for poorer women and their children. Women attend education classes 
once a week for four weeks before any loan activity, which then starts on the fifth week. Working in 
partnership with credit unions offers several advantages to this village banking program: 
(a) credit unions have a social agenda (which suits FFH) in addition to providing financial services, 
(b) credit unions mobilize their own funds (deposits) for loan purposes, 
( c) credit unions usually have a large and widespread network of member organizations, 
( d) credit unions are eager to attract new members, especially women, 
( e) credit unions are run on cooperative principles, which coincides with village banking principles, 
and 
(f) credit unions value peer recognition and approval. 
By hsing credit unions, FFH is able to implement its village banking program within a well-
structured microfinance organization and to achieve outreach fairly quickly by having access to the 
large network of credit unions in poorer areas of the country. Member credit unions readily accept 
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the partnership because it allows them to attract more members and especially increase their pool of 
women members. Village banking offers them an opportunity to lend to poorer members. 
I 
Credit unions treat village bank women groups as any other group member such as the AV s. 
Each group is treated as an individual member of the CU. The women guarantee repayment of each 
other's loan at both the solidarity group and the credit association levels. Thus, the Kafo Jiginew did 
not have to add a group technology to their regular individual savings and loan technology t> 
accommodate the FFH village banking program. It has been a fruitful symbiosis. 
1. Policies 
Under the village banking program at the Kafo Jiginew, groups of women form credit 
associations (CAs) of 16 to 36 members made up of solidarity groups of 4 to 6 women. Credit 
associations register as members of the local credit union and receive their first loan for four months. 
As of December 1996, there were 264 CAs which were members of 15 local Kafo Jiginew CU s. 
2. , Technologies 
Credit unions use their own funds to lend to village-bank members. Women go through a 
training program that lasts four weeks before they receive their first loan. The program, which started 
in August 1995, is run by 15 animatrices (coordinators) paid by FFH. During the training period they 
meet the coordinator every week and save CFAF 100 (US$ 0.2) to CFAF 500 (US$ 1.0) per week 
per woman tb constitute the group fund and accumulate the required membership fee of CF AF 10,750 
(US$ 21.5) for a group of 30 women to open an account at the Kafo Jiginew. Each woman pays 
CF AF 350 (us $ 0.7) as membership fee. There are also additional fees for photos. 
During the four-month loan period, forced savings of CF AF 100 per week go into the internal 
account. The minimum first loan is CF AF 2500 (US$ 5) and the maximum first loan is CF AF 25,000 
(US$ 50). There is also a maximum loan ceiling of CF AF 150,000 (US$ 300), which is reached after 
about 11 loan cycles of four months each. For the first three cycles, 1115 of the loan amount is 
reimbursed every week. Loan repayment is due every week during the first three loan cycles, then 
every two weeks until the sixth cycle, and monthly repayment starts with the seventh cycle. 
The 'nominal interest rate on the loans is 13-16 percent per cycle depending on the credit union 
(12 percent for the program and 1-4 percent for the village bank association). The average inflation 
rate was 5.8 percent per year in Mali in the period 1990-1997, so these rates are positive in real terms. 
There is alsq contribution to a guarantee fund required by the Kafo Jiginew equal to 5 percent of the 
loan amount. 
The internal account is made up of loan repayments, plus forced savings (CF AF 100 per week), 
plus voluntalty savings, plus the group fund. The group fund is made up of leftover voluntary savings 
accumulated to pay the membership fee at Kafo Jiginew, plus penalties levied on village bank members 
for missing or being late at meetings, plus occasional grants, plus interest on loans. This internal 
account earns 3 percent annual interest in a savings account at the Kafo Jiginew. Group funds can be 
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used for group projects or can be partly used to pay membership fees at the Kafo to open individual 
account for village banks members chosen by their peers. 
I 
Wonten are allowed to take different loan amounts within the group. At the end of every loan 
cycle, memb¢rs are allowed to withdraw their savings and usually do so. Loan sizes increase by CF AF 
12,500 every new cycle. FFH intended loan sizes to increase by 50 percent every new cycle, bu 
village banltjng management at the Kafo Jiginew was applying a different rule for fear of too rapid 
growth in loan sizes from one cycle to another. Thus, if the first loan is CF AF 25,000, the second loan 
will be CFAF 37,500 (25,000+I2500), and the third loan will be CFAF 50,000 (37,500+I2,500). 
As of December I997, the oldest of the 264 existing associations were in their 6th cycle. By 
the time thel associations reach their I I th loan cycle and CF AF I 50,000 (US $ 300) in loans, it is 
hoped that the women will have accumulated enough savings to "graduate" to the Kafo Jiginew, by 
opening individual membership accounts at the credit union and enjoying additional financial services 
reserved to full-fledged individual members. In fact, village bank members have already rewarded 
some ofthei~ members with an individual account at the Kafo Jiginew, paid for by the group fund 
These new taro members can remain as village bank members to take advantage of the education 
program. 
3. ! Outreach 
As of September I 997, there were 6, 736 village bank members in 264 credit associations at 
I3 Kafo Jiginew credit unions. There were I2 to 22 credit associations per credit union. Members 
in the associaitions represented I 5 percent of total Kafo Jiginew membership, of whom only 8 percent 
are female. Total loans outstanding were CF AF 136, 788,000 (US$ 273,576) granted to 5,859 active 
borrowers. the total amount of deposits was CF AF 8,920,460 (US$ 17 ,84 I). 
Villa~e bank member loans are not funded by bank member deposits but from Kafo Jiginew 
funds which include deposits as well as outside funds from the BNDA. The highest loan amount at that 
time was registered at the oldest associations, which were at their sixth loan cycle. This implies that 
each membe11 had a loan of CF AF 87,500 (US$ I 75). The FFH village banks cater mostly to women 
and the poor!in general, who start with loan sizes of CFAF 25,000 (US$ 50) or less. 
4. Sustainability 
The HFH village banking program with the Kafo Jiginew had a repayment rate of 100 percent 
compared to 95 percent for the credit union network itself. The design chosen by FFH to work with 
the Kafo Jiginew gives a whole new perspective to the survival of its village banking program, since 
its long-term 
1
viability is intimately linked to the sustainability of the partner credit unions. Thus, the 
sustainabiliaj of the credit associations is highly dependent on the sustainability of the partner credit 
union. Creditassociations are also (group) members of the Kafo. In contrast with the original FINCA 
village bank model, which relies entirely on outside funding for on-lending, FFH has chosen a clear 
path ~o s~tr· ability by integrating its associations into well-structured and performing financial 
orgaruzatlon . 
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Table 15. Indicators of Outreach of the FFH Village Banking Program with the Kafi 
Jiginew in Mali, 1997. 
Number of credit associations 
Number of village bank program staff members 
Number of association members 
Number or outstanding borrowers 
Outstanding loan balances (CF AF) 
Outstanding savings (CF AF) 
Source: Freedom From Hunger and Kafo Jiginew files. 
5. Operational self-sufficiency 
September 30, 1997 
264 
25 
6,736 
5,859 
136,788,000 
8,920,460 
The organization's operating costs as a percentage of its average loan portfolio reveal how 
much it costs to lend one CFAF. In the case of the Kafo Jiginew, operational expenses were 14.5 
percent on average over the two-year period of 1995 and 1996 (Table 15). In 1996, CF AF 0.17 was 
spent for every CF AF 1 lent. The Kafo Jiginew credit unions are able to run a reasonably efficient 
operation for this type of clientele, keeping operating costs at a low proportion of their loan portfolio. 
Operational self-sufficiency, defined as the ability of these organizations to cover their operating 
costs with revenues, had not been yet achieved. At the Kafo Jiginew credit unions this proportion was 
90 percent on average (Table 16). The credit unions were able to cover close to 90 percent of their 
operational costs with their revenues. Thus, the Kafo Jiginew credit unions, though not operationally 
self-sufficient, were very close to achieving this goal. Operations at the credit unions are becoming 
increasingly self-sustaining. 
Avetage return on assets (ROA) increased from 4.7 percent in 1995 to 7.7 percent in 1996. 
I 
Average return on equity (ROE) also increased from 19.4 percent in 1995 to 35.8 percent in 1996 
(Table 16). These ratios suggest that the Kafo Jiginew credit unions are performing above industry 
standards. These ratios overestimate the profitability of the Kafo Jiginew credit unions, however, 
because they include a strong positive impact of donor grants, such as those from FFH, on program 
revenues and equity. If the preceding years are any indication of the future, nevertheless, aggregate 
profitability of the Kafo Jiginew credit unions is expected to increase in the years to come. 
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Table 16. Financial Indicators and Operational Efficiency at the Kafo Jiginew, 1995-96. 
Sept-30-95 Dec-31-1996 
Financial expenses 27,195,782 56,954,875 
Operating expensesa 
i Total expen$es 
Financial inciomeb 
Other income 
Total income 
Net income 1 
Financial assets 
Average total assets 
Average total equity 
Total liabilitfes 
Average ou~standing portfolio 
Operating expenses/average outstanding portfolio (%) 
Operational self-sufficiencyc 
ROAd 
RO Ee 
Gross financial marginr 
Net operating marging 
Source: Kafo Jiginew reports. 
All amounts in CF AF. 
160,067 ,343 296,264,341 
187,263,125 353,219,216 
186,947,314 326,163,668 
80,698,644 223,198,527 
267,645,958 549,362,195 
80,382,833 196, 142,979 
1,687,315,008 3, 132,412, 704 
1,708,362,276 2,536,643,305 
414,387,983 548,303,394 
1,708,362,276 3,364,924,333 
1,356,158,497 1,713,373,508 
11.8 17.3 
91.3 89.9 
4.7 7.7 
19.4 35.8 
9.4 10.6 
0.0 -1.1 
Notes: a: Operating expenses are equal to personnel expenses and administrative expenses, 
including depreciation of fixed assets. They do not include financial costs and loan loss 
prov1s1ons. 
b: . Financial income= income from interest and loan fees. 
c: Operational self-sufficiency =Financial income /Financial costs+ Operating costs+ 
Loan loss provision. 
d: ROA= Net income/Average total assets. 
e: ROE= Net income/Average total equity. 
f: Gross Financial Margin= (Financial income - Financial costs) I Average total assets. 
g: Net Operating Margin= Gross financial margin- Operating costs I Average total assets. 
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6. Financial self-sufficiency 
The sustainability of the Kafo Jiginew credit unions depends on their financial self-sufficiency, 
i.e., their ability to generate sufficient income to cover not only operating costs but financial costs as 
well. The net operating margin for the Kafo Jiginew was -I. I percent in 1996 (Table 16). A negative 
net operating margin reveals that the Kafo Jiginew credit unions are not covering their total costs with 
income derived from their loan operations. In fact, the credit unions receive grant money from donors 
such as FFH for their operations, but not for on-lending purposes. 
7. Ownership and governance 
The fFH village banking program at the Kafo Jiginew is managed by a staff made up of a 
I 
director and 15 animatrices or coordinators hired and remunerated by FFH. Each animatrice is 
responsible for several credit associations. The elected management committee at each association is 
comprised ofa president, secretary, treasurer, comptroller, information and organization counselor, and 
an education counselor. The management committee also oversees and documents all transactions at 
the village bhnk. The animatrice attends all weekly meetings, which include education sessions on 
health and nutrition, and supervises loan repayment. 
The credit association members rely on group governance and peer pressure to ensure prompt 
loan repayment. However, the association itself is a member of the local Kafo Jiginew credit union, 
from which it gets it loan funds. Thus, credit members should have the same claims on credit union 
assets as other members (Stack, 1997). The Kafo Jiginew is subject to the same diluted ownership 
structure that exists in any credit union. This structure carries with it the conflicts of interests of the 
dual role of client and owner. 
So far, these conflicts have been minimiz.ed by active deposit mobilization, but they will increase 
I 
with growing access to external funds, which create the threat of borrower domination. Furthermore, 
the rule of one person, one vote may constrain the growth of deposits. In turn, the village banks 
themselves are subject to the shortcomings and advantages of group rather than individual credit. 
Figure 4. ' FFH Village Banking Design within the Credit Union Framework. 
Credit Union 
I 
Village Bank 
Village Bank 
FFH: Working with Credit Unions 
FFH 
USA 
Credit Union Network 
Credit Union Credit Union 
Village Bank Village Bank Village Bank 
Village Bank Village Bank Village Bank 
C. Save the Children Foundation 
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1. Organizational design 
Save the Children Foundation (SCF) started its integrated development approach in Kolondieba, 
Mali in 1988 .. The program included water, health, and credit services for the target population. The 
first SCF vill~ge banking program started in 1991 in 15 villages where a Communaute Villageoise de 
Developpement (CVD) was created as a channel to disburse agricultural loans to members. The CVDs 
were transformed later on into associations villageoises (A Vs), concerned with all development aspects 
of the villag~, not just financial services. 
The AV organizational structure included three units, one each in agriculture, health, and credit. 
The AV s received a grant of CF AF 29 million (US $ 50,000) to offer loans for agricultural inputs to 
the villagers1• Some loans were granted for three to four years, even during the early stages of tre 
program. La~r, the credit unit at the AV was transformed into a specialized financial organization or 
COVEC (Cooperative Villageoise d'Epargne et de Credit). 
In th~ meantime, from 1988 to 1991, the AV members were trained in the management of 
financial se&ices to prepare them for transformation into COVEC units, which were to be run like 
credit unions. Thus, each COVEC was organized around a general assembly, a management 
committee, a 1credit committee, and a supervisory body. Members of a COVEC pay CF AF 1,050 (US 
$ 2.1) as a fee, and CFAF 1,000 (US$ 2) buys the member a share. Loans are granted principally to 
buy agriculnbl inputs or cereals and for microenterprises. Forced savings of 10 percent of the loan 
amount are required of every borrower. 
All ~OVECs then formed the Union des Cooperatives Villageoises d'Epargne et de Credit 
(UCOVEC) in 1991, in which the original 15 villages were included. When the number ofCOVECs 
grew from IS to 43 villages, UCOVEC formalized its existence by becoming Faso Jigi, the federation 
of all COV1£Cs, which remains the only legally recognized entity of the network. A total of 1,493 
people had r~ceived loans from the 43 COVECs as of December 31, 1996. The repayment rate was 
only 36 percent of amounts due. In view of this low repayment performance, the program was being 
revised. All COVECs were to be closed, leaving Faso Jigi to act as the only credit union for the whole 
Kolondieba district. If the experience proved successful, other credit unions were to be opened in 
municipalities and later on in villages. 
' 
It wa5 against this background that the SCF introduced its village banking program, called the 
Group Guarantee Lending and Savings (GGLS) Program. The program started in March 1995, in an 
effort to boost female membership in Faso Jigi. The GGLS started, with USAID funding, in five 
villages of the Kolondieba district and with CFAF 12.5 million (US$ 25,000). 
The OGLS program is being run by 15 SCF staff members in Kolondieba, including eigh 
coordinators responsible for several GGLS units. Each GGLS unit is comprised of three solidarity 
groups of six' women each, for a total of 18 people per GGLS unit. The women know each other well. 
They choose five members to form the executive committee, made up of a president, secretary, 
treasurer, aq.d two other officers. 
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As of December 31, 1997, there were 34 GGLS units in as many villages in the Kolondieba 
district. While some GGLS units were members of the local COVEC, others were stand alone groups 
(see Figure p). The total membership was 2,580 women, who were involved in diverse economic 
activities such as petty trade and microenterprises. 
2. Policies 
Funds for the GGLS program come from SCF, even for those GGLS units that are members 
oflocal COVECs. The first loan to a GGLS unit is between CF AF 5,000 and CF AF 25,000 (US$ 10 -
50), for a period of four to six months. The term to maturity is four months in towns and six months 
in villages. The solidarity groups that form a GGLS unit can demand different loan amounts not to 
exceed the maximum for the cycle. Members of each solidarity group of six women receive, however, 
the same loan amount. 
The ainnual nominal interest rate charged on loans is 28 percent. Repayment is due every week. 
An additional 5-percent application fee is charged per loan, and members are required forced savings 
of 5 percent of the loan amount. Therefore, the effective annual interest rate on loans was 3 7.5 percent. 
In real terms, the rate was 31 percent in 1997. After a year into the program, due to numerous 
complaints from members, repayment schedules were changed and payments were required twice a 
month. Loan sizes increase 10 percent from one cycle to the next and, at the end of each cycle, women 
are allowed to withdraw part or all of their accumulated savings. The oldest GGLS units are at their 
seventh loan cycle, with a six to eight month terms and an average loan size of CF AF 3 7 ,500 (US$ 7 5). 
3. Lending technologies 
SevetaI solidarity groups made up of six women each form a GGLS unit. In Kolondieba-ville, 
one unit was1 made up of 72 solidarity groups of six women each, for a total of 432 GGLS members. 
Each village bank member pays a one-time membership fee of CF AF 100 (US $ 0.5). The three elected 
executive officers of the GGLS (president, treasurer, and secretary) are in charge of reviewing loan 
applications for submission to SCF. 
Soliqarity group members are granted the same loan amount each. This amount may differ 
throughout the GGLS from one solidarity group to another. Groups are thus allowed to take different 
loan amounts. In fact, in one of the villages visited, some members were still demanding CF AF 25,000 
(US $ 50) after the fifth loan cycle. Group liability serves as collateral for all loans. In case of default, 
other GGLS members would repay the loan and expect to be paid later. If a member behaves in a 
fashion that is not appreciated by other group members, she can be asked to leave the group. GGLS 
members me~t every time a loan payment is due (once a week) and at the beginning of each loan cycle, 
when new lqans are granted. 
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4. Outreach 
GGLS units provide small loans largely to poor women in rural and urban areas. The average 
loan size as of September 30, 1997 was US $ 50 at the time of disbursement. As of that date, the 
program had a loan portfolio of CF AF 25,041,000 (US$ 50,082) with 2, 178 loans outstanding (see 
Table 17). 'I1hese clients appear to be poorer than those of other programs in this case study. 
The number of women borrowers grew from 780 in September 1995 to 2,378 in September 
1997, i.e., a 221 percent increase. The outstanding loan portfolio increased 65 percent and savings 
increased 55 l'ercent from December 1996 to September 1997. These are forced deposits equivalent 
to 5 percent of the loan amount, however, withdrawable at the end of the loan cycle. There were no 
voluntary savings in the program. The long-term objective of the program is to reach 4,500 women 
in 75 villages in Kolondieba district. The breadth of outreach of this program is therefore not as 
significant as in the other cases. 
5. Sustainability 
The repayment rate at the GGLS program was 100 percent of outstanding loans as of 
September 1997. The program, however, is not sustainable. The operational self-sufficiency ratio was 
only 27 percent and the financial self-sufficiency ratio was 25 percent (see Table 17). That is, program 
revenues covered only about one-quarter of all program costs. The program hopes to achieve 86 
percent sustainability after five years, i.e., by the year 2000. 
Table 17. Indicators of Outreach and Measures of Performance for the GGLS Program in 
Mali, 1996-97 
A. Program Characteristics 
Number of loans outstanding 
Volume of loans outstanding (CFAF) 
Number of dompulsory savings accounts 
Proportion df female clients (%) 
Staff members 
Nominal annual interest rate on loans(%) 
Effective annual loan interest rate(%) 
Real annual•loan interest rate(%) 
B. Performance Measures 
Operational self-sufficiency (%) 
Financial self-sufficiency (%) 
Number of active loans/staff 
Average loan size (CFAF) 
Source: GGLS files. 
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Dec. 31, 1996 Sept. 30, 1997 
2,178 2,472 
25,041,000 26,206,000 
764 2,472 
100 100 
17 17 
28.0 28.0 
37.5 37.5 
31.0 31.0 
27.2 
25.0 
155 
24 
For the future of the GGLS program, Save the Children is training local women orjurumuso, 
who would ~sist the SCF staff monitor GGLS activities, including loan repayments. Another element 
in the exit plan of SCF is to rely on Faso Jigi, the credit union, for the provision of future funds for the 
program. Th~ SCF will continue to provide technical assistance, supervision, and some funding. Faso 
Jigi be a leghlly recognized credit union, and it can continue to attract funds from the commercial 
banking sector, particularly from the BNDA, the Malian Development Bank. Faso Jigi was successful 
in borrowing twice from BNDA in 1995 and 1996. BNDA lent to Faso Jigi at 10 percent annual 
interest rates for nine months. Faso Jigi lent that money to its member-COVEC at 11 percent annual 
interest and the ultimate borrowers were granted loans at 17 percent annual interest. 
Thus~ the future of GGLS is tied to the performance and sustainability of Faso Jigi. The 
arrangement of having the GGLS women linked to a well-functioning microfinance organization is 
better than operating as stand-alone groups, whose future would be far less certain. Many issues must 
be resolved, nevertheless, for this program to become sustainable. 
6. Ownership and governance 
The GGLS units rely on group governance. Members of the group are the owners and residual 
claimants of the village bank's assets. The common future of Faso Jigi and the GGLS units calls for 
an executive management committee to represent all 34 GGLS units at the Faso Jigi's management 
level. Thus, the GGLS units will become members of Faso Jigi and would be entitled to one vote as 
other individual shareholders as well as to all other membership rights that a credit union member is 
entitled to. 
Agaitii, all issues concerning the stability of borrowing groups are relevant for the GGLS units. 
Moreover, the shortcomings of property and governance structures of CUs will also influence the 
opportunities I for success of this experiment. Linking the village banks to a credit union is a good idea, 
as the FFH experience in Mali illustrates, but it is not sufficient. Strong management skills and 
sustained technical assistance are also needed. Aspiration to large-scale operations are also important 
to address economies of scale issues and to evolve into a more complete organization. 
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Figure 5. SCF Village Banking Partnership with Local Microfinance Organizations 
SCF: Par1!nership with Local Microfinance Organizations and Direct Implementation 
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D. Cathplic Relief Services 
1. Organizational design 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) operates village banking programs in several African countries, 
including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. CRS usually operates through local 
NGOs, which may be involved in other activities besides microfinance. The organization provides start 
up funding and technical assistance to local partners but also expects them to develop into autonomous 
microfinance organizations. The amount ofresources devoted to capacity building of the partner NGOs 
may be subs~antial. This is a long-term endeavor, especially when the NGOs do not specialize in 
microfinancel 
CRS ~edits village banking program in Benin in 1992 in partnership with CREDESA, a local 
NGO which specializes in health-related activities. CREDESA (Centre Regional pour le 
Developpement et la Sante) was created in 1983 to provide heath services to the rural population. It 
is also involved in research and training. The village banking program mixes credit with some education 
on health issues and literacy, which are compulsory programs that the village bank members must 
attend. 
! 
i 
The '1illage banking program started with six banks, and it expanded in 1994 to two other local 
NGOs. The~e are the Groupe de Recherche et d'Action pour la Promotion de I 'Agriculture et du 
Developpement (GRAPAD), in the Mono region, and the Centre de Recherche des Idees de 
Developpement Agricole et Artisanale (CERIDAA), in the Oueme region. By December 1997, CRS 
was running a total of 59 village banks through CREDESA (24 banks), GRAPAD (19 banks), and 
CERIDAA (16 banks). CERIDAA operated another eight village banks sponsored by Oxfam, an 
international NGO. 
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2. Policies 
CRS provides the initial fund to start the village banks as well as ongoing technical assistance 
to the partner NGOs. The fund is allocated as loans to village bank members and, when repaid, it 
constitutes th~ external account for the program. The local NGO receives additional complementary 
funds from CRS at every new loan cycle, to grant increased loan amounts to members until the 
maximum loan limit is reached. 
Villa~e banks are formed by a group of 50 women, who form solidarity groups of 3-8 people. 
This is the same mechanism used by other Malian programs to deal with the large number of members 
in the village bank. This, in turn, reflects that there is only one village bank at each location. Each 
solidarity group is run by a credit chief. The management committee at the village bank level is made 
up of five m¢mbers (president, secretary, treasurer, and cashier), who are all solidarity group chiefs. 
The maximum first loan amount is CF AF 25,000 ($50). Forced savings of at least 20 percent 
of the loan amount are required. Each loan cycle is six months long. The interest rate on loans is 15 
percent per cycle (2.5 percent per month), of which 10 percent is kept by the NGO, 3 percent is kept 
in the internal account of the village bank, and 2 percent is designed to account for inflation. The 
effective cost of a loan to borrowers is raised substantially due to the requirement of forced savings. 
Loans are repaid on a monthly basis and consist of 1/6 of the interest, 116 of the principal, and 1/6 of 
the forced saiings due. The amount of the loan in the next cycle is obtained by adding the accumulated 
savings to the previous loan amount. 
A voluntary savings deposit of CF AF 200 to CF AF 500 allows the village bank to open an 
internal accoUnt for a member. Savings are still not being remunerated by the village banks, although 
this is highly encouraged by CRS. This will not be likely to happen, however, with such an important 
element of forced savings still in place. The village bank's internal account is made up of interest earned 
on loans, fotced and voluntary savings, and other revenues from penalties levied on members for 
diverse reasons. Village bank members cannot withdraw their accumulated forced-savings before the 
end of the program. They can, nevertheless, withdraw their voluntary deposits, if any are available. 
Funds from the internal account are used in some village banks to grant loans at a higher interest rate 
(18 - 25 percent) and at shorter terms to maturity than six months, to non-members. These loans are 
repaid in a monthly basis. 
The tpaximum loan amount in a village bank is CF AF 100,000 ($200), to conform to the desire 
to cater to the poor, according to CRS. This ceiling is reached in the 6th loan cycle, after roughly three 
years, if village bank members take up the maximum loan size permitted at each cycle. Village bank 
members artj allowed to take less than the maximum loan amount available each cycle. 
I 
The CRS originally anticipated the village bank to become self-sufficient at that point and to 
be able to rely on its savings and internal account to continue its operations. Village bank members 
would each have accumulated CFAF 70, 000 ($140) in savings. However, in the field things did not 
operate as pianned. The oldest village banks have already reached their eighth cycle and are still not 
self-sufficient. CRS has no plan to pull out its funds from the program. One lesson learned from this 
field experience is that six cycles are too short for the village bank to achieve self-sufficiency, if ever. 
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The accumulated savings by that time are still low and less than the amount of the last loan received 
by the membrrs (CF AF 100,000). Thus, the belief at the local CRS office in Cotonou is that members 
should be allpwed to continue their village banking activities as long as they wish. 
An example pf the loan methodology for a CRS village bank of 50 members is as follows: 
I 
The maximwh loan amount for the first loan cycle is CF AF 25,000. The initial funds needed from CRS 
by the local ~GO are CFAF 1,250,000 (25,000 * 50). Complementary funds equal to the savings 
accumulated !by the membership would be needed from CRS for every new loan cycle. 
(1) Cycle 1:' 
Loan l= CF~F 25,000; forced savings CFAF 5,000 (20%) 
'1 
(2) Cycle 2: l 
Loan 2= CFij\F 30,000 (savings +loan l); savings= CFAF 6,000 
Total funds 4eeded: CFAF 30,000 * 50 = CFAF 1,500,000 
Funds alreadr available at the NGO= CFAF 1,250,000 
CRS complementary funds: 5000* 50 = CF AF 250,000 
I 
(3) Cycle 3: ! 
Loan 3 = CF(AF 36,000 (savings +loan 2); savings= CF AF 7,200 
Total funds deeded: CFAF 36,000 * 50 = CFAF 1,800,000 
Funds already available at NGO= CFAF 1,500,000 
CRS complementary funds: CFAF 6000*50 = CFAF 300,000 
3. Lending technologies 
CRS provides technical assistance to its partner NGOs on an on-going basis. Most partner 
NGOs do no~ specialize in microfinance, which is an important weakness. Thus, at least a one month 
effort is allopated to training NGO staff on the village banking methodology, accounting and loan 
management,! and monitoring procedures. CRS monitors partner NGOs by requiring quarterly financial 
statements oiji all village bank operations, including internal account loans to non-members. 
I 
Villale banks are formed by women who know each other well. Members attend 30 
compulsory lt?urs of education courses, once to twice a week. Sessions last one and a half hours and 
focus on hei:Uth, literacy, numeracy, and loan management. This combination of financial and non-
financial sen1ces differentiates these programs from specialized financial organizations. Village bank 
members m~et twice a month, once for education courses and the second time for loan repayment 
Solidarity grtjup members meet more often. Only village bank members and sometimes village leaders 
are allowed tf attend these meetings. Members who fail to attend any meeting without valid reasons 
or who com~ late to meetings are penalized and have to pay a fine. 
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Loan repayment relies on group monitoring, peer pressure, and group liability. Members who 
fail to pay th'ir loans are pressured by others, who can visit the borrower's family members or even the 
village chieflin an effort to get the money back. Anyone who wants to leave the village bank should 
pay off all het debts first. The accumulated deposits by the departing member can also be used to pay 
off any outs~ding debt. 
Th~ is no physical collateral requirement for a village bank loan obtained from the local NGO. 
However, loans granted to non-members from the internal account require a guarantor who is a village 
bank memb~ or physical collateral. In case of default, the group is penalized and cannot get another 
loan. Sine~ the inception of the program, at least three village banks have closed due to bad 
performancef Any village bank member can take a "break" from the program, i.e., refrain from 
acquiring a ~ew loan at the end of a particular cycle, however, and rejoin the program later on. 
4. ! Outreach 
! 
CRS~believes in poverty lending and especially in targeting women. Other CRS principles 
include using a group-loan technology, promoting local savings, and building financial self-sufficiency. 
As of June 0, 1997 the CRS village banking program in Benin had 2,702 members, of whom 82 
I 
percent wer~ women (see Table 18). The volume of loans outstanding was CFAF 44,852,376 (US$ 
89,705), for i,313 loans with an average loan size of CF AF 40,000 (US $ 80). The poverty index in 
Benin is bas~d on income of less than CF AF 10,000 (US $ 20) per month. 
Table 18. Indicators of Outreach for the CRS Pro ram in Benin 
A. Program Characteristics 
I 
Number of ~artner NGOs 
Number of~illage banks 
I 
Number of village bank members 
i 
Proportion ff female members (%) 
Number of oans outstanding 
Volume of 
1 
oans outstanding (US$) 
Average loiim size (US$) 
Total savin~s balances (US$) 
B. Perfortance Indicators 
Operational self-sufficiency (%)a 
(%) 
reports 
June 30, 1997 
3 
59 
2,702 
82 
2,313 
89,705 
80 
71,104 
39.7 
22 
Notes: a: Operational self-sufficiency is reported is for the three partner NGOs, and it was 39.7 
percent for all of their activities. It was 96 percent for their financial activities only. 
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5. Sustainability 
The ~illage banking program has closed several banks since its inception because of bad 
performance.' As of June 30, 1997, repayment of outstanding loans at the functioning 59 village banks 
was 72 percent, with an arrears rate of 22 percent (see Table 18). Lack of operational self-sufficiency 
of the program implied that revenues covered only 39.7 percent of operating costs, when all activities, 
financial and educational, were taken into account. Operational self-sufficiency of 96 percent was 
claimed when only credit activities were considered (CRS-Benin Third Annual Report, September 
1997). 
For the long-term sustainability of the program, CRS is considering the creation of an apex 
organization that would provide technical assistance and channel donor funds to partner NGOs. If 
things go according to plans, the apex organization would be created in Benin by the end of 1998, as 
well as in Senegal and Burkina Faso, where CRS operates similar village banking programs (see Figure 
6). Creation of an apex will not correct, however, for the shortcomings and lack of sustainability of 
the retail org~izations. 
6. Ownership and governance 
The CRS village banks are developed by NGOs. Most often, these NGOs do not have a clear 
ownership structure, and this may translate into diluted and confused ownership at the village bank 
level. It is not at all clear whether village bank members remain the sole residual claimants of the village 
bank's assets in case of dissolution. 
Figure 6. CRS Village Banking Design: An Apex Model 
CRS: Apex Model 
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Village Bank 
Village Bank 
E. Policy Recommendations 
Seve¢ lessons and policy recommendations for the sustainability of village banking programs 
emerge from this case study: 
(a) Voluntary deposit mobilization should be emphasized and forced savings de-emphasized. 
(b) An individual-loan technology should be considered in addition to group lending, and loans 
should not be targeted to specific clienteles or uses. 
( c) NGOs implementing village banking programs should realize that building a financial institution 
is a long-term process that requires several years of intense cooperation. 
' 
(d) Ideally, a support facility should be in place before the sponsoring agency leaves. This facility 
woulql be in charge of providing continuous technical support and auditing services. 
The ntain remaining issues concern ownership and governance. These issues are still an open 
question in village banks and even in the caisses villageoises. Although the CVECAs have successfully 
dealt with the iownership and governance issues so far, there is still concern as the caisses grow outside 
of their village settings. What will happen when the village structures change or the caisses villageoises 
move to a m'ore urban environment, where family ties and other traditional arrangements of social 
cohesion no longer exist? Will the caisses villageoises restrict themselves to a village environment that 
suits them beSt or will they adopt a new organizational form to address new concerns of ownership and 
governance il) less hospitable settings? 
The P ARMEC law governing mutualist organizations also remains an important unresolved 
issue. What Will organizations like the village banks, in their present form, do? The most dangerous 
provision of tqe P ARMEC law remains the cap on interest rates that these organizations can charge on 
their loans. At present, the ceiling rate would not allow microfinance organizations, especially those 
newly created; to be sustainable. Hopefully, as the law is tested in the field, it may induce lawmakers 
to revise it in the direction that would benefit all microfinance organizations. 
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Annex A 
Contact for Village Banking Study 
Caisses villa~eoises, Mali: 
Adama Kodio, Director, Service Commun 
Daniel Saye, Officer, Service Commun 
Moctar Y ellcouye, Officer, Service Commun 
Malick Tembely, Officer, Service Commun 
Freedom from Hunger and Kafo Jiginew, Mali: 
Aminata Ballo, Manager, Village Banking Program 
Sidiki Kone, General Inspector, Kafo Jiginew 
Peggy Roark, Freedom from Hunger, USA 
David Dao, Kafo Jiginew 
Save the Children, Mali: 
Aboubacar Konate, Administrator; Sahel Field Office in Bamako 
Jeff Ramin, Technical Advisor 
Barnabe Diarra, Project Coordinator, Kolondieba 
Amadou Diarra, Coordinator, Village Banking Program 
Ahoua Toure, Vice-manager, Village Banking Program 
Catholic Relief Services, Benin: 
Ange Tingbo, Catholic Relief Services, Benin 
Anne Sellers, Project Administrator, Cotonou 
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